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Germany and Poland since 1989 have become lands of contested memory, as reflected by 
their attempts to commemorate the series of reforms that led to the end of their 
Communist regimes. This study is an attempt to analyze the various modes of 
commemoration dedicated to the transition from communism that have taken place in the 
intervening years between 1989 and the present. Included amongst these efforts are 
events occurring in public spaces, such as official remembrance ceremonies like Berlin’s 
Festival of Freedom in 2009, physical monuments, and institutions dedicated to 
preserving memory, specifically the Gauck Authority in Germany and the Institute of 
National Remembrance in Poland. An evaluation of the various forms that 
commemorations may take demonstrates the pluralities of memory in Germany and 
Poland, and how political factions have used this malleable state of memory to construct 
popular narratives. The most common narrative that has been seized upon by right-wing 
factions in both countries, and which has been supported by the official state memory 
institutions, is the false demographic separation of Communist era Germany and Poland 
into lands comprised solely of victims, perpetrators, and collaborators. Despite the major 
differences in their transitional processes, Germany and Poland followed similar 
trajectories in their commemorative paths, beginning with an initial period of little 
commemorative effort in favor of a national focus on political and economic 
development. After a period in which both countries saw similar major shifts in their 
national governments, the opening decade of the current century saw a resurgence of 
right-wing politics which brought about the aforementioned focus on memory. The recent 
focus on memory and commemoration attests to the fact that only now is the transitional 
period coming to a close, as younger generations with little to no personal memory of 
1989 have begun to receive higher education and enter the workforce. Likewise, by 
studying Germany and Poland in particular, two countries with contrasting transitional 
experiences yet similar tracks in post-transition memory development, it is shown that 
there is likely a pattern to how the former Communist bloc countries that experienced 
peaceful reforms have remembered their post-transition experiences, and that this has 














Table of Contents……………………………………………..ii 
 
1. Introduction…………………………………………….1 
2. Chapter One: Berlin Remembers…………………..…8 
A. Background……………………………..……….8 
B. Commemorations……………………………….18 










For central and eastern Europe, 1989 was perhaps the most defining year of the 
last quarter-century. That year marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War, with 
revolutions sweeping through the Communist bloc in a wave of public demand for free 
and fair elections, the end of Soviet meddling in domestic and foreign policy, and 
changes to crumbling economic infrastructures. The wave of reforms began in Poland, 
where years of activism by Solidarity and other interest groups succeeded in bringing 
Communist reformers to the Round Table Negotiations, the first event of its kind, and 
subsequently the first semi-free elections of the European communist countries. At its 
climax, 1989 saw the end of the Berlin Wall, the physical reminder of the division of 
Europe that had kept East Berlin shuttered to the West for over twenty years. The sudden 
end to the wall was seen around the world on television and in newspapers, and was 
greeted by the cheering crowds in Berlin as the end of an era. 
 Two decades later, the world still remembers 1989 as a seminal event in modern 
human history. The intervening time has seen a cavalcade of literature, film, and popular 
art commemorating the tumultuous year that heralded the beginning of the end of 
Communism in Europe. By augmenting the public consciousness with a multitude of 
commemorations and memorials, a collision between collective memory and personal 
memory became inevitable. What is at issue is the process by which commemorations of 
a transformative event in a nation’s history reformulate or repurpose meaning from that 
event, resulting in a change to collective memory.  
In order to determine the capabilities of a commemorative event as an agent in 
shaping collective and individual memories, one may look to Poland and Germany as 
 2 
prime examples. The importance of these two countries in this study is critical because of 
their contemporary importance within the Communist bloc in 1989, their current 
importance within Europe, and the significance of their histories in Europe in the period 
preceding 1989 as well as the era preceding the Communist takeover. Poland’s history as 
a partitioned territory, followed by its brief life as an independent state, the subsequent 
collapse of Polish independence during German and Soviet occupations, and its eventual 
development as a communist country, are all massive historical markers that would play a 
great part in shaping Polish understanding of its role in 1989. While Germany’s history 
follows a different path, it nonetheless draws on its turbulent and militaristic past in 
reconciling its tumultuous unification process, its involvement as antagonist in two world 
wars, its bitter separation into two distinct countries until peaceful reunification following 
1989, and its status as an economic powerhouse in the post-Cold War world. A 
comparison of Germany and Poland will reveal that despite the differences that former 
communist countries faced in their transitions to democracy, the processes begun by 
peaceful reforms allowed for a common set of commemorative practices that may have 
been present throughout the former Communist Bloc. 
By understanding the steps that Poles and Germans have taken to remember 1989, 
at both the private and public level, it will be possible to define a specific motive behind 
commemorations. It will be clear that commemorations do not occur organically, but are 
instead a calculated effort to remember a shared past outside of the bonds of personal 
memory. In so doing, it becomes clear that commemorations occur most frequently 
during times of deep national division, and are an attempt to impose ideologies on the 
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past as befits actors within the present.
1
 The most clear-cut examples of this which will 
be discussed are that of Alexandra Hildebrandt’s Freiheitsmahnmal (Freedom 
Monument) in Berlin and the use of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) as a 
political tool by the Freedom and Justice party (PiS) in Poland. Crucial to this 
undertaking are the unique similarities shared by the examples. Both were backed by 
right-wing political movements and came to prominence in 2005, after a period of left-
wing leadership in the government, both were highly controversial, and both grew as part 
of a response to the perceived failure on the part of the national government to properly 
recognize victimization at the hands of Communists.
2
      
This study will be undertaken in a threefold manner. First, major specific 
examples of how Germany and Poland have commemorated 1989, both publicly and 
privately, will be documented. Doing so will help to further the second purpose, which is 
to illuminate the changing faces of national identity over time. Even though only a little 
more than two decades have passed since 1989, unmistakable changes in how Poland and 
Germany choose to commemorate can be readily identified. Finally, the third step in the 
process is to use these commemorations as a starting point in determining how nostalgia, 
remembering, and the collective memory can be implemented as tools in reshaping the 
way the public interprets history.  
                                                 
1
 Radoslaw Poczykowski, "Building The Past, Forgetting The Future: Is Poland A 
Historical Knowledge Based Society?." Limes 1, no. 1 (June 2008): 25-26. Explaining the 
late flurry of activity in commemorations in Poland, Poczykowski speculates, “This 
return to the past might be viewed as the answer to the serious political, cultural, and 
social crisis.” 
2
 As will be discussed, the Polish government created the IPN in 1997; however, its 
period of heightened controversial activity began in 2005 with the election of the 
Kaczynski brothers to the Presidency and office of the Prime Minister.  
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An analytical inquiry into commemorative efforts of Germany and Poland will 
reveal new insights into how 1989 transformed those countries, politically, economically, 
and culturally. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, an argument can be made 
that commemorations not only reveal transformative processes, but are in fact catalysts 
for transformation in their own right.  
Documenting the changes in Poland and Germany since 1989 serves a basic 
historical function, to be sure, but it will also show how Poles and Germans remember 
their recent history, history in which they also served as actors. It will show what they 
remember, what they choose to forget, and the importance it played in their lives at the 
time, as well as what importance they have ascribed to it over time. Hopefully, this study 
will demonstrate how societies, following a tremendous transformative event, use that 
transformation to progress as a people, how it affects their consciousness, and how it can 
change their sense of national identity.  
Integral to the discussion of any form of commemoration is the concept of 
collective memory. How societies choose to remember, what they remember, and why 
they remember is a process that offers no end of complications. Collective memory as a 
staple of national identity is an idea that has existed for decades, but has gained 
significant traction since Maurice Halbwachs first delved into the “social sources of 
memory” in 1925.
3
 However, while that theory has been widely accepted, arguments 
persist that challenge a general theory of collective memory. As Susan Pearce has 
claimed, “the mnemonic image of the nation…may not ever be fully collective.”
4
  
                                                 
3
 Susan Pearce, Solidarity in Retrospect, 161. 
4
 Ibid, 162. 
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 That social memory is of paramount importance in the formation of modern 
nations has become a norm within the field of memory history. What debate exists 
centers around which social factors are most important in shaping collective memory, and 
more semantically, whether collective memory is in fact achievable. The quote from 
Pearce is indicative of the fact that there are some scholars who maintain that it is 
impossible to achieve a fully collective memory, because there are too many sub-groups 
within national cultures, and counter cultures as well, each with its own particular 
memory. For instance, if a collection of sub-groups were to form a consensus memory, 
then it is possible this could become the dominate popular national memory; however, it 
is again possible to have conflict between popular and political memory. Even within a 
society that may have a dominant national memory, there can still be a large faction that 
promotes its own dissent memory. An example of this scenario can be found in Poland 
after the election of the PiS government, where right-wing memory of the end of 
Communism conflicted with the previous transition narrative put forth by Solidarity and 
its allies. Yet with the rise of the right-wing Law and Justice government, dissent 
memory became the dominant political memory, asserting that there was a popular outcry 
of support for the belief that there had not been enough of a break with Communism. 
This belief led to the formation of some the former Communist bloc’s toughest lustration 
policies, enacted eighteen years after the 1989 contested elections. Along with this 
change in memory came the co-opted usage of the formerly non-partisan IPN as the 
central tool for lustration.  
One proposed basis of memory and identity formation is the postulation that 
personal memories can overlap one another, and on a large scale may codify into a 
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patchwork resulting in collective memory. Halbwachs offers several examples to further 
explain this presumption, one of them being a comparison between a schoolteacher and a 
student.
5
 The teacher could remember having at one point taught a class, though they 
have no specific memories of students’ names, faces, or curriculum. The student, 
meanwhile, informs the teacher’s memory by filling in the gaps, since the student does 
have specific recollections of the class. Through this exchange, the teacher’s memory is 
supported by someone else’s recollections. Halbwachs asserts that this process is 
constantly active in all societies. Expanded to the national level, it would explain how 
Germans and Poles who lived through 1989 remember particularly poignant events 
though they did not witness them personally. The gaps in an individual’s memory are 
filled in by the recollections of others.  
Trouillot offers another, similar example of personal memory. In it, he argues that 
one may remember how to tie a shoe, even though one may not “engage in an explicit 
recall of images every time we routinely tie our shoes.”
6
 The underlying presumption 
beneath both of these premises is the issue that while personal memory exists within 
everybody, it can be reshaped over time to incorporate multiple experiences, each 
different in its own right, but each related to the primary memory in such a way that they 
create a bank of knowledge augmenting the initial experience. To Halbwachs’s point, on 
a larger scale this knowledge bank can be added to by the experiences of others, which is 
the foundation of memory or identity formation.  
                                                 
5
 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, (New York: Harper & Row. 1980), 51.  
6
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 14. 
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 Halbwachs’s original premise rests in the fact that, regardless of the patchwork 
nature of the social sources of memory, historical truths still exist within collective 
memory. More current historians have challenged this assumption.  Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot concurs with Halbwachs’s assessment of the social sources of memory; 
however, Trouillot differs with Halbwachs in the belief that any sort of fundamental truth 
can result from collective memory. This is not to say that Trouillot asserts that there can 
be no truths in history. Obviously, in order for there to be a present, there had to be a 
past, and Trouillot’s similar analogy to Halbwachs’s teacher-student exercise 
demonstrates this. What Trouillot really claims is that history and narrative are 
necessarily inseparable.  
 Within Trouillot’s argument is the assertion that any one historical event can have 
multiple narratives. This is not just because every individual remembers events 
differently; rather, it is because any group must have a basis in a historical past to 
validate its existence. Historical narratives are socially constructed despite the fact that 
individuals may have conflicting personal memories. These contradictions are the most 
curious and also the most telling aspects of collective memory, because an individual 
may be compelled to wholeheartedly accept a consensus memory even when his own 
individual recollections are at odds with the historical narratives.  
 Trouillot further postulates that the focal points for collective memory are the 
silences of history. The inability of historical truths to speak for themselves leaves social 
groups to speak for them. Therefore, in the creation of collective memory, silences from 
the past can be forgotten or glossed over, in favor of those recollections more useful for 
the place and time. This explains how the meaning of a shared past can change within 
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one culture over time, or how contemporary groups can remember the same event so 
vastly differently.  
This discussion points out the inherent complications in trying to understand 
collective memory. There is no right or wrong way to remember, and each group will 
choose its own understanding of the past. Memory can occur from the top down, meaning 
that it is focused on events occurring at the top levels of society and government, moving 
down to the broader societal levels. Conversely, memory can be focused on the bottom 
up, progressing from popular movements up to the leadership level. Memory is also 
affected by space, which will be seen in great detail in the case of Berlin. This study will 
attempt to show how Germany and Poland have dealt with memory in the context of their 
transitions to democracy, and how their relationship to the past has informed their 
understanding of the present. It will highlight not only their differences, but also their 
similarities, and will highlight how those similarities have created a common 











I. Berlin Remembers 
A. Background 
Commemorative activities in post-1989 Germany are a mixture of privately and publicly 
funded. It is necessary to draw a distinction between private and public memorials 
because there are differences between the two that separate them beyond the source from 
which they draw their funds. Having a collection of private and public commemorative 
spaces is by no means exclusive to Germany; rather, it is a state of being familiar to most 
countries. Germany’s predicament is unique because it requires both private and public 
commemorations to directly confront one another by navigating a level of historical 
overlap not seen in most modern states. The juxtaposition of private versus public 
commemorations and historical overlap are the two themes that have most shaped the 
trajectory of German commemorations of 1989. 
Regarding the struggle between private and public memorials, there have been 
some prime examples within the last decade alone that articulate both the differences 
between the two types and the methods by which one may impact the other. In the most 
recent notable instance, that of the Freiheitsmahnmal in 2005, which will be discussed in 
greater detail, it can be seen that the special interests of some private memorials reach a 
level of such notoriety that they are adopted into use by official memorials. Conversely, 
the failure of a public memorial or event to address a specific issue can spark the creation 
of a private memorial with a special interest at its heart. Both of these themes have been 
major issues impacting the development of German commemorations of 1989.  
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 Another major feature of German commemorations is the theme of overlap. 
Germany’s modern history is by no means secret, and its notorious role in the Holocaust 
and Second World War has had an indelible impact on the modern German nation, to 
state the case mildly. This history is especially apparent in Berlin, where the political 
center of Nazi power and the front line of the Cold War shared the same space. With the 
weight of that history upon it, perhaps it is not surprising that one of the most popular 
ways to remember the past in Berlin has been to intentionally draw parallels between the 
two eras. Physical examples of this are prevalent throughout the city, nowhere more 
evident than at the Brandenburg Gate and the Topography of Terror. The Brandenburg 
Gate was utilized by the Nazis as a powerful symbol of German militaristic nationalism 
during the fascist period, and was the scene of spectacular rallies. Conversely, the gate 
played a sad role during the Cold War period as an abandoned monument, cut off from 
Berliners by the Berlin Wall. The Topography of Terror, which encompasses a former 
Gestapo prison and the offices of Adolf Eichmann, among other grisly Nazi relics, is 
bordered in part by remnants of the Berlin Wall.
7
 These prove that historical overlap, a 
theme critical to understanding how Germany remembers its experience in 1989, most 
often finds its physical roots in one of Berlin’s most significant landmarks, the Berlin 
Wall.  
The Berlin Wall is arguably the greatest symbol of the Cold War. As the physical 
manifestation of Churchill’s “Iron Curtain,” the only thing more sudden and unforeseen 
than its construction was its destruction. After nearly three decades of dividing one city 
                                                 
7
 Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, "`Topography of Terror' in Berlin: Is remembrance of forgetting 
possible?" Journal Of Arts Management, Law & Society 25, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 17.  
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through its heart, in just one night the wall became irrelevant. Many of the German 
commemorations of 1989 have focused on events directly related to or impacted by the 
wall, so it is necessary to pay attention to the wall’s legacy by understanding what the 
wall represented during its existence, and what it has meant since its collapse. 
 Construction of the wall began on August 13, 1961, when “East German police 
officers and soldiers begin barricading the Eastern sector of Berlin from the three 
Western sectors, preventing any further migration.”
8
 By August 26
th
, the wall was 
complete, stemming a flood of East Germans escaping into West Germany, and 
effectively sealing off Berlin from the West. At the same time, border controls were 
tightened across the entire East German frontier. Almost overnight, small towns that had 
once been in the heart of Germany suddenly became border towns. Such was the case of 
Kella, a town in the Catholic Eichsfeld region of Germany, where residents had been 
unable to attend mass at their local church for decades when it became impossible for 
them to cross the newly impenetrable border into the neighboring village.
9
  
And so the wall remained for twenty-eight years, scarring the very heart of Berlin. 
The wall is physically absent now, but even in its absence there are reminders of its 
existence, not only in the form of monuments and commemorative events, but in the 
hearts and minds of Berliners and Germans who lived on either side of the Iron Curtain. 
                                                 
8
 “Berlin Divided…And Reunited: 1961-1989,” The Berlin Wall: Twenty Years Later, 
George Clack, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International 
Information Programs, 2009): 23. 
http://www.america.gov/publications/books/berlin_wall.html 
9
 Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German 
Borderland  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).  
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The wall continues to divide how Ossis and Wessis remember their history, and how they 
are shaping their future.  
The end of the Berlin Wall came about suddenly, with no notice given to either 
side. November 9, 1989 saw West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a delicate 
situation. As scheduled, Kohl spent the day in Warsaw, meeting with leaders from both 
sides of the Polish political spectrum to discuss the new relationship that the FRG and 
Poland would have to build.
10
 In the course of the day, Kohl was interrupted by the 
unexpected news that events in Berlin were taking a wild and unprecedented turn. Kohl 
realized that he would have to fly to Germany as quickly as possible, since it was his duty 
as chancellor to be in Germany should anything of such magnitude occur, and of course 
the announcement by Gunter Schabowksi of the GDR’s decision to open the gates 
dividing West and East Germany was of unparalleled significance. Kohl excused himself 
as politely as he could from his Polish obligations, to the annoyance of many Poles he 
was scheduled to meet with, and flew back to Bonn, the West German capital, before 
being flown to Berlin.
11
  
On November 10, standing in front of a hostile crowd of West Berliners, Kohl 
declared in a speech, “I would like to call out to everyone in the GDR: You are not alone! 
                                                 
10
 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 50-52. The change of government in Poland had 
brought with it concerns over the post-World War II Polish-German border. Kohl was in 
Warsaw to shore up relations with the new government, and to offer assurances of no 
new change in frontier policy on the German side. The Poles were miffed by Kohl’s hasty 
departure, but the issue would soon be settled permanently as a result of the 2+4 process. 
11
 Ibid., 52. Despite its close proximity to the Polish border, Kohl had to make this 
roundabout trip because West German aircraft were still denied landing clearance in 
Berlin. Kohl actually flew to Berlin in a non-German, third party aircraft.  
 13 
We stand at your side! We are and will remain one nation, and we belong together!”
12
 
The audience soundly booed him. The mayor of West Berlin, Walter Momper, not a 
member of Kohl’s more conservative Christian Democrats, declared that Kohl had not 
taken the pulse of the people, that, “he’s stuck in yesterday’s thinking.”
13
 He did not 
realize that unification was the dream of an older, more conservative generation. The 
younger, liberal Germans, especially Berliners, were far more interested in a free 
European state.
14
 Many East Berliners felt the same as their counterparts. A unified 
Germany was a secondary issue for many people. Most important was to have a Europe 
with open borders and free movement of people, with full cooperation between all 
European states. What need would there be for a unified Germany in such a system? It 
could only be a hindrance, especially considering that the two states varied greatly in 
their social and economic systems. Incorporating one state into another would mean 
completely changing the way of life for millions of people in the GDR, possibly 
removing some of the benefits that they may have actually enjoyed in a socialized state. 
True, East German life was difficult, and the massive state security apparatus vigilantly 
upheld repressive measures, but that does not mean that all East Germans were totally 
opposed to the fundamental values of the underlying system. Most East Germans hated 
the government of the GDR, but they did not hate socialism. There was a hope that they 
could maintain elements of a socialist state that would continue to provide benefits to 
workers, while implementing a fully democratic, multi-party electoral process.  
                                                 
12
 Ibid, 53 
13
 Ibid, 53. 
14
 Ibid, 53. 
 14 
Articles from 1999 support this idea. Nearly a decade after unification, 
unemployment in former East Germany was more than double that of the west. Data from 
the Federal Statistics Office put the unemployment rate in the former GDR at 17.2%, 
compared to 8.3% in the former FRG; likewise, there was an equally large gap in GDP 
per capita, at only $15,632 in Eastern Germany compared to $27,887 in Western 
Germany.
15
 It can be said that those capable of finding employment in the east were still 
making more money than they had in the GDR, however, they did not have the social 
safety nets in the new unified Germany that they had enjoyed previously. Barbara Lassig, 
one such East German, became the owner of her apartment building after the wall fell.
16
 
While she now had opportunities that she could not have had in the GDR, she said that 
she was forced to deal with a market she had never faced under socialism. She had to cut 
more than half her employees in just one year, and constantly faced trouble paying her 
mortgage. She looked back fondly at her life in the GDR, where she taught physical 
education to kindergarten classes. Unfortunately, she could not keep that job in the new 
Germany, as the federal government did not provide economic support for that position.
17
  
1999 saw a Germany that was still facing an identity crisis. It had to deal with two 
halves that had developed different economic and social systems over the previous forty 
years, and was forced to confront the problems of a large sector of the population 
characterized by growing discontent and resentment towards the new system. Many 
easterners were angered at the “political arrogance” displayed by the west in unification, 
and many westerners were upset by the amount of support they had given to the east 
                                                 
15
 Jack Ewing, “A Nation Still Divided,” BusinessWeek, (November 8, 1999), 70.  
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid.  
 15 
without receiving their due appreciation.
18
 Perhaps this is why much of the focus in 1999 
was in looking towards the future. Looking at the past could often only bring resentment, 
especially in a country like Germany, which had faced such a tumultuous twentieth 
century. Instead, with unification now a fact of life, the federal government and the 
German states began looking ahead to create a new Germany based more on pan-
European ideals, rather than trying to recreate a Germany based on the past. With this 
attitude, the federal government made a hugely symbolic move in 1999 by abandoning its 
longtime seat in Bonn and making the newly unified city of Berlin the capital of the 
newly unified Germany.  
The official commemoration in 1999 was very unlike its successor in 2009. 
Whereas 2009 would feature a stunning drama unfold in a stacked line of dominos, with 
music and revelers filling the streets, 1999 was an altogether bleaker affair, reflecting the 
pensive attitude Germans had over their present and past. Looking on from a distance, 
television audiences might have seen a fairly boisterous crowd, but in reality November 
9, 1999 was a political spectacle, and a largely unimpressive one. On the ground in 
Berlin, Timothy Garton Ash reflected that, “ten years on, the celebration is a purely 
political and media event…the scenes from 1989 have been replayed so many times on 
television that they have lost their impact.”
19
 A crowd gathered in front of the 
Brandenburg Gate for the television cameras in order to create the illusion of drama, 
which of course the event was really lacking. In reality, most people remained at home on 
this rainy night. Television had relayed the news of November 9, 1989 to the world, just 
                                                 
18
 “Not Quite Grown Up,” Economist, (November 7, 2009), 24.  
19
 Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from 
Europe in the 1990s  (New York: Random House, 1999), 350. 
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as now, ten years later, television was attempting to recreate a drama that was no longer 
there. So television created a story that did not exist, and that story was then told around 
the world. “The anniversary of the ultimate modern event,” says Garton Ash, “is marked 
by the ultimate postmodern event.”
20
 
If 1999 saw reluctant Germans trying to look ahead, to move away from their 
checkered past and escape the realities of the hardships that followed unification, 2009 
saw Germans triumphant. By comparison, Germany was doing much better in 2009 than 
it was in 1999. The economy was in a much better shape, which goes a long way in 
helping to improve any country’s attitude, and the hardships of reunification, and of life 
in the former GDR itself, was beginning to fade, in large part due to the aging of the first 
post-communist generation. As the younger generation continues to age, the national 
memory of 1989 will continue to shift. Since this new generation has no memory of 
communism, dictatorship, or division, it cannot incorporate those things into its collective 
consciousness based on personal memories. It must therefore learn 1989 on its own 
terms, stripping important events of their original meaning and replacing them with 
something more comprehensible. The events that they will uncover are still in the process 
of being interpreted by a generation that lived through the transition. Through the use of 
memorials, commemorative sites and spectacles, art installations, and federal archives, 
Germans are collectively reshaping their identity. What they will leave to later 
generations to interpret is the way in which they wish themselves to be perceived. 
Initially, this view was nuanced, with an emphasis placed on coping with the realities of 
everyday life, but over time it has morphed into something simpler and more easily 




defined. The narrative of victims and perpetrators has largely taken over German 





















One theory of memory formation claims that memory is rooted in a sense of place, and 
nowhere in the former Communist states is this more evident than in Berlin. Littered with 
remnants from a tragic past, Berlin typifies the notion that “a sense of place…is 
inextricably linked to memory formation, which is, of course, crucial to identity 
formation, both at the individual and collective levels.”
21
 Sifting through the sites 
connected to memory in Berlin is an exercise in cultural self-awareness. One is never far 
from a space connected to the terrors of multiple bygone eras, often overlapping one 
another.  
 How Berliners navigate their historical places, or how they choose to 
commemorate, is reflective of how they have shaped their identity as a unified city in a 
unified country. Choosing what to commemorate and what to leave alone or tear down is 
indicative of a choice between what to remember and what to forget. This aspect of 
memory formation is unavoidable. They could choose to commemorate everything, or 
they could choose to commemorate nothing, but at some point a choice has to be made by 
one agency or another, and in this decision is the foundation of memory formation.  
The official twentieth anniversary celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
2009 culminated with an impressive array of massive dominoes. Acting as the climactic 
event of the “Festival of Freedom,” the dominoes were arranged in a line following the 
path of the original Berlin Wall, symbolizing both the physical wall and the chain-
reaction of events in 1989 that ultimately led to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, a 
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series of events that is often referred to as the “domino effect.” A party atmosphere 
pervaded the day, with Germans from multiple generations, including those who had 
lived through the entire span of the GDR and World War II and those who grew up after 
the wall had already been torn down, reveling in music filled streets and watching as 
former Polish president Lech Walesa pushed over the first domino.
22
   
 The jovial celebration at the domino wall is intentionally reminiscent of the first 
moments when the real wall began to fall, and in large part seems as if it was trying to 
recapture the same sense of unity and unrestrained joy. By intentionally mimicking the 
revolutionary events of 1989 on a macro scale, event organizers managed to remind 
attendees of emotions and hopes that had prevailed in the same space twenty years 
before; amongst these were hope following the end of forty years of repression, for one, 
and the chance of reuniting with loved ones and fellow countrymen who had been 
trapped on either side of the Iron Curtain. In a larger context, the celebration also served 
as a literal demonstration of how events within the Eastern Bloc unfolded that year. Lech 
Walesa, the hero of the Solidarity movement and the Round Table negotiations, pushed 
over the first domino representing Poland. Following that, according to the narrative of 
the event, it was inevitable that the other dominoes, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Baltic republics, and so on, would all fall in their turn.  
The dominoes themselves, 1000 in total, were hand-painted by thousands of 
children from around the world, a generation born after communism, whose only 
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experience of the Berlin Wall comes in the form of stories from their parents or 
grandparents, or in lessons in primary school.
23
  
The goal was to remind the world and its leaders that walls, both physical and 
political, still exist across the globe, but with seemingly one push, they, too, can fall. In 
an overtly symbolic gesture, the last remaining domino, which failed to collapse, was 
covered in Chinese symbols. Appearances by heads of state and other dignitaries from 
around the world elicit the feeling that not just the former Communist countries, but 
indeed the whole world, wanted to see the end of repressive rule in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The ceremony itself was evocative of the standard narrative of 1989; that is, that 
after one successful revolution, the stage was inevitably set for others.  
While the domino ceremony emotionally recaptured what happened in November 
1989, absent was the reason for why that happened, and of the wall’s lasting 
repercussions. The long-term impact of reunification was not to be seen or felt as the 
dominoes fell. For many years after the wall fell, East Germans felt alienated living in 
their new country. The issue of how to approach the subject of division was and is a sore 
one that impacted not only the adults who lived through the change, but also the children 
who are learning a still malleable national history.  
German economic successes since 1999 have begun to blur some aspects of the 
troubles of reunification, and many German schoolchildren, who were born after 
reunification, are still not fully aware of the significance that forty years of division had 
on Germany. The very dominos that played a seminal role in the 2009 commemoration 
were painted by hundreds of school children from around the world, a generation born 
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after communism, whose only experience of the Berlin Wall comes in the form of stories 
from their parents or grandparents, or in lessons in primary school.
24
 Amongst those 
children, few grasp the full nature of the wall. That year, a survey was conducted of 16 
and 17-year-old schoolchildren from Berlin. According to the survey, “66 percent … 
didn't consider the GDR a dictatorship.”
25
 Clearly there is some kind of disconnect in 
Germany, if a sizeable percentage of students is unaware of one of the most negative 
aspects of the GDR. It is difficult to determine what exactly is the cause of this. In part, it 
may be a sign that nostalgia for the GDR is growing, rooted in the loss of some social 
benefits that had been provided by the East German state. 
 Another possible reason behind that disconnect is the possibility that only in the 
present is Germany becoming truly united. It may be true that for adults who lived during 
the time of division, emotional and mental unification may never be completely possible. 
It is only with the coming of age of this younger generation that real unification will be 
possible. As several authors have speculated, “Keeping in mind that life courses unfold as 
cumulative processes, one can easily derive that the unification of the two Germanies will 
be concluded not before the first post-transformation cohorts will have entered school, 
training, and the labor market.”
26
 
As oppressive as their state may have been, many East Germans lived a major 
portion of their formative years and adult lives in the GDR, and therefore recognized it as 
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a legitimate state. Displeasure with the ruling party and the nature of authoritarian rule 
did not necessarily mean that East Germans were unhappy with some of the benefits 
afforded to them, including in many cases guaranteed state employment. After 
reunification, the bulk of these jobs ceased to exist. The entrance into a new, well 
established economic system left newly unemployed East Germans in a tenuous state 
where they had fewer savings and less opportunity than their West German countrymen. 
These problems were never fully rectified, and were a constant source of tension for most 
of the 1990s. Even in the most recent decade, the failure of some East German states to 




 Also possible is the failure of teachers to effectively communicate with students. 
There are still history teachers who once taught in East Germany and who have had a 
difficult time in revising the narrative of that state since reunification.
28
 Whatever the 
case may be, it is becoming clearer with time that the narrative of the wall and 
reunification is increasingly at odds with historical interpretation. As time passes, and 
East Germans continue to catch up to their West German counterparts in terms of income 




The Festival of Freedom in 2009, which espouses the Western (particularly 
American) view of the Cold War, depicts a land of victims and perpetrators in the East 
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and a nation of suffering victors in the West. It is the culmination of a trend of Wall 
memorials in Berlin that began after 1999. Before then, however, a different style of 
commemoration had earned the spotlight.  
Prior to 1999, in searching for monuments and commemorative spectacles 
specifically related to 1989, what one finds is a lack of concrete examples rather than the 
plurality that one might expect. Instead of following in the tradition of older revolutions 
in either country, commemorations surrounding 1989 tended to be more academic in 
nature, and certainly seemed to encourage the commemorator to be inwardly reflective 
rather than outwardly ebullient.  This new pattern was a thoughtful shift towards a more 





Century Central Europe. Such reasoning is in line with the peaceful negotiated revolution 
in Germany, and the FRG’s post-war policy of moderation at all costs, a policy which 
helped contribute to the stability of the West German government in turbulent times, 
from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl.
30
 
One of the distinguishing features of Wall remembrance in the decade 
immediately following 1989 was the decentralized nature of commemorative efforts. 
Even the few official public commemorative sites that existed were still purposefully 
decentralized, and often placed in parts of the city that had little tourist traffic. The 
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governing ethos of the era was one of anti-monumentalism, a strong break with Berlin’s 
Prussian, Wilhelmine, and National Socialist past. This break should by no means be 
shocking. After all, both the FRG and GDR had spent the five decades since the end of 
the war distancing themselves as much as possible from the monumentalist cultures that 
had dominated political life in the country in its past, and led it into economic and 
physical ruin. 
 Since 1999, however, the attitude towards commemorating the Wall has changed 
in Berlin. The Berlin Senate, under pressure to produce a tourist-ready, centralized 
commemorative site, has bowed to demands and progressively centralized Wall 
memorials around a facility on Bernauer Straße. Private attempts since 1999 have also 
been successful at co-opting attention and tourist dollars, most notably Ukrainian-born 
Alexandra Hildebrandt and her Haus am Checkpoint Charlie and Freiheitsmahnmal in 
2005-2006. These later efforts arose for two reasons. In part, they stemmed from a view 
of the GDR generated by research done under the auspices of the Gauck Authority, the 
monolithic institution designated to archive all former Stasi files. The second reason 
these later memorials came into existence was as a direct result of Right-wing reactions 
to a failure by the Left to properly, in their opinion, memorialize the struggle of East 
Germans under Communism. The political Left had held a more prominent role in the 
federal government under the chancellorship of SPD politician Gerhard Schroder after 
the failure of Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democrats to maintain power for 
conservatives in the 1990s. This mirrors a similar situation that also affected Polish 
commemorations, as shall be seen later.  
 25 
Debates over how the wall should be remembered began almost as soon as it fell. 
While factions were arguing the merits of leaving up portions of the wall for memorial 
purposes or if it should be torn down in its entirety, the government, souvenir seekers, 
and enterprising entrepreneurs settled the matter for them. The wall, which began to be 
referred to in the past tense even before it was completely demolished, was taken apart 
piece by piece and reutilized for building projects within the city, though some 
individuals capitalizing on worldwide demands collected pieces of the wall and shipped 
them to buyers all over the globe. Over the next few years there was no major public 
attempt to organize a central facility to remember the wall, although over 100 different 
memorials now exist in the city.   
Before 1999, the biggest single memorial to be planned for Berlin would be the 
controversial Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, alternately referred to as the 
Berlin Holocaust Memorial.
31
 This particular monument, massive in scale, provoked a 
protracted debate over its appropriateness, particularly in its form and location.
32
 The 
monument was to be (and since has been) erected near to the Brandenburg Gate, 
purposefully situated on a site where the Wall used to run, forcing Berliners to draw 
comparisons between the two events upon any reflection of the monument. This naturally 
provoked ire in some, who felt that the events should be remembered separately, if 
remembered at all. To many Germans, the Wall has come to represent German 
victimization and suffering, an unfortunate if albeit more comfortable past emotionally, 
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whereas the particular placement of a prodigious monument to Nazi atrocity is a thorn in 
the paw of the German collective consciousness.  
Another concern over the monument, even amongst those who felt that the 
discussion of Germany’s principal role in the Holocaust was open for public discussion, 
was the fear that such a massive memorial would change the landscape of Berlin. They 
wanted Berlin to be a living, new city, and in the 1990s the term “New Berlin” took root 
as building projects skyrocketed and money was poured into neglected areas of the city. 
Berliners did not want to be hampered by the ghosts of the past, a feeling which 




The drama surrounding the Berlin Holocaust Memorial is a prime example of 
Berlin’s struggle to deal with historical overlap. In a place where memory seems destined 
to be determined by space, the issue of how to utilize those spaces has become 
increasingly difficult. As seen by the declaration, “The discussion is a monument,” many 
Germans would rather relegate their historical memory to temporal space rather than 
physical space. Perhaps the motivation behind this is the desire to heal old wounds and 
rebuild, rather than allow the memory to linger indefinitely. Yet it is apparent that there is 
also a desire to allow for an open and very physical discussion of the past, reflected by 
the monuments themselves. By constructing monuments on top of one another, or more 
specifically to build a Holocaust memorial near to an important Cold War artifact, 
Germans are drawing a direct connection between the two events. That the ultimate 
decision was in favor of the monuments speaks to the fact that Germany has decided its 
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history must be remembered physically, and that rebuilding efforts would have to coexist 
with the desire to physically remember.  
As for other commemorative efforts in Berlin directly involving the end of 
Communism, the trend in the 1990s was for reflective, impermanent monuments. The 
biggest effort to commemorate the Wall was the public Übergänge competition from 
1996-1999, which allowed entrants to submit proposals for public art installations across 
the city.
34
 Offering seven different perspectives of the history of the Wall and divided 
Berlin, Übergänge was a chance for artists to draw on the plurality of the experiences of 
life in the shadow of the Wall. The projects were also meant to be impermanent, though 
in many cases there was no specific date to officially end the installations or remove 
them, meaning that the art pieces themselves would deteriorate and morph over time. 
This was in fact an intentional aspect of Übergänge developed by the competition 
designers and was meant to instill the sense that interpretations of the Wall and the GDR 
would inevitably change over time, so the monuments should change with them.
35
 There 
is no such thing as a permanent monument, at least in terms of meaning. A large stone 
monument may last for a thousand years, but its intended meaning, whether created by a 
private individual or group or funded publicly by a government at any level, will 
inevitably change as popular memory shifts. Examples of this are numerous, and many of 
the most prominent are in areas that have seen the rise and fall of the nationalism-charged 
period of the 19
th
 Century, fascism, and communism. Included in this list are the 
Hungarian Millennium Monument and Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate.  
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Though decidedly not a German monument, the story of the Millennium 
Monument is still one of the most fascinating examples of what one monument can come 
to represent over time, and how the changing winds of national memory can still embrace 
it even when the national direction is so far from the monument’s roots. 
 Originally constructed to commemorate one-thousand years of the Habsburg 
dynasty, even as that glorious bastion of imperialism was beginning to waver under the 
strains of growing demands from competing nationalities, Budapest’s Millennium 
Monument was to enshrine the Hungarian people’s love of their Habsburg emperor Franz 
Josef. But with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire at the end of the First World War, 
the Millennium Monument became a relic of a bygone era. Almost overnight, its meaning 
was changed forever.  
But the story of the Millennium Monument does not end there, because even after 
communism took hold of Hungary, the monument to Hungary’s long deceased foreign 
emperors remained. Hungarian Communists were unwilling to remove the statue, which 
stood for everything they opposed, because “[they] were unwilling to pay the potential 




The Millennium Monument thus serves as a perfect example of the value of 
physical landmarks in culture, but also of the often-unstable nature of their representative 
status. Monuments easily become “central public symbols,” but can be repurposed by 
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The Brandenburg Gate is another powerful symbol of the strange effects of 
landmarks through time, and of Germany’s continued struggle with overlap. Next to the 
wall, the Brandenburg Gate is easily one of the most recognizable symbols in Berlin, yet 
its recognizability spans multiple epochs, leaving the towering monument imbued with a 
plethora of possible emotional responses. Sanford Levinson has said, “All monuments are 
efforts, in their own way, to stop time.”
38
 In a way they do accomplish this, but the 
unintended consequence of monuments is that so often the collective vision of the time 
that the monument is meant to represent changes. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for a 
monument to come to represent a multitude of moments in time. A visitor remarking the 
grandeur of the Brandenburg Gate can at once envision the imperial dreams of the 
militaristic Prussians, with the goddess Nike perched atop, waving them on to victory. 
Simultaneously, the Brandenburg Gate can be a backdrop for a torchlight parade of 
Nazis; as an abandoned ruin in the heart of divided Berlin; or, conversely, as a symbol of 
unity with thousands of champagne popping, cheering onlookers watching as the Berlin 
Wall is rendered irrelevant.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, since 1989 the area around the Brandenburg Gate has 
become Berlin’s unofficial “Memory District.” Stretching out south from the Reichstag, 
lies a series of memorials that incorporate different layers of Berlin’s history, including 
the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Unter den Linden, the Brandenburg Gate 
and Pariser Platz, Checkpoint Charlie and Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, the Topography 
                                                 
37
 Ibid, 9.  
38
 Ibid, 7. 
 30 
of Terror, and the Jewish Museum.
39
 A common theme of these exhibits is one of 
overlap. The northern boundary of the Topography of Terror, an installation intended to 
instruct the visitor of the disturbing realities of the Gestapo, is an intact portion of the 
Berlin Wall.
40
 Without needing to be explicitly stated, there is a natural comparison being 
drawn between the two events from different eras of German history. The wall, a symbol 
of repression, subjugation, and division, was a direct result of the policies that created the 
Gestapo. The overlapping monuments serve as a reminder to Berliners and tourists of the 
negative consequences and grim realities of radical politics.  
Beyond Berlin’s permanent monuments that seek to blend collective memory, two 
artificial post-1989 installations in particular, different in both meaning and function, 
gained the most notoriety among visitors and the public. The Übergänge art competition 
of 1996-1999, publicly backed by the Berlin Senate, was a chance for artists to offer their 
own vision of the wall.
41
 The artists were allowed a great deal of scope, and did not have 
limitations on the message they chose to send. Some of the messages were reflective, 
some were humorous, some were hopeful, but all of them offered a unique interpretation 
of what the wall could mean to Germans on either side. They reflected the plurality of 
opinions, and did not relegate anyone, East German or West German, into the category of 
victim or perpetrator. Übergänge was instead a humanistic interpretation of 1989, and as 
such was a chance for Germans and foreign tourists to move beyond the radical past.  
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The seven artists whose designs were chosen were: Frank Thiel, Gabriele Basch, 
Heike Ponwitz, Karl Sachse, Susanne Ahner, Thorsten Goldberg, and Twin Gabriel.
42
 Of 
these artists, several stand out as being the most memorable and most popular. Thorsten 
Goldberg’s “Stein – Papier – Schere” at the Oberbaumbrücke Bridge is quite a unique 
sight. Suspended in the supports of the elevated rail bridge, Goldberg has placed two 
round neon lights, which turn on in the evening, each alternating one of three possible 
signals: rock, paper, scissors. The ongoing competition between the two hands is meant 
to “raise the question of how decisions are made.” Much in the way that political 
decisions are often greeted by confusion, the competition committee was particularly 
swayed by the way the art “subtly [integrated] itself into the structure – the way coats of 
arms would be lined up – and yet [provoked] viewers’ confusion.”
43
 
Karla Sachse’s Kaninchenfeld at the Chauseestraße crossing is a playful look at 
some of the most successful Wall subversives: the famous rabbits who managed to make 
their home in the no-man’s-land of the infamous Death Strip.
44
 The silhouettes of 120 
rabbits, an “object of projection for people on both sides of the Wall,” are meant to assert 
their “independence from the unreasonable demands of political didacticism,” according 
to the jury.
45
 The rabbits dot the street and sidewalk around the former border crossing, 
although in keeping with the theme of the contest, over time the rabbits have been 
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incorporated into the city, as buildings and other permanent structures pave over Sachse’s 
vision. 
Perhaps the simplest of the art installations to understand, at least from a visitor’s 
perspective, are Frank Thiel’s Ohne Titel light boxes located at the former site of 
Checkpoint Charlie on the Friedrichstraße, the famous border between the American and 
Soviet sectors of Berlin.
46
 These light boxes are identical to others found all across Berlin 
that are used for advertising purposes, only here instead of corporate slogans, the light 
boxes contain pictures of soldiers, one American, one “Soviet,” facing off in an eternal 
staring match.
47
 The overt symbolism of the two portraits is not hard to lose. According 
to Thiel, “these portraits translate the omnipresent sector signs of the past – ‘You are 
leaving the American/British/French sector’ – into picture form…By using two portraits 




Thiel’s vision, putting a human face to the division of Berlin, was representative 
of the Übergänge project as a whole. It was meant to be a reflective project for people to 
remember the recent past and the experiences they and their countrymen went through. 
There was no blame assigned to any person or group, and was instead intended to foster 
new community growth processes. A major factor of Übergänge, one that separates it 
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from later publicized memorials, was that it was far less concerned with tourist traffic.
49
 
Übergänge was attempting to encourage thoughtful growth without relying on any one 
group’s post-Cold War ideology.  
Occurring simultaneously with the Übergänge competition was the development 
of a new archive, known as the Gauck Authority, which sought to bring to light the 
Byzantine structure of the hated Stasi security force. Though intended as an open 
resource for researchers, legal structures and inherent defects of the authority’s 
administration would have a longer lasting impact on German memory formation than 
Übergange, and would help usher in a new mode of thinking about East Germany that 
would directly influence memorials in the future.  
As the discussion of Übergänge has shown, the decade after 1989 in Berlin was 
an odd memorial landscape. Some effort was made to commemorate previous historical 
events, as evidenced by the Berlin Holocaust Memorial and the Topography of Terror, 
but little was done to commemorate the end of communism. It has been suggested that 
this is because Berliners were unsure how to broach the subject. The art installations of 
Übergänge are reflections of uncertainty. Coming to terms with reunification, Boym 
postulates, has been a major hurdle to commemorations. She recognizes that, “Before 
1989, there were two German states – German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) – but presumably one cultural tradition and one nation. Now 
it turns out that there is one state with two different nations, Ossis and Wessis, with their 
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own cultural traditions and frameworks of collective memory.”
50
 While Übergänge 
directly addressed this issue, other institutions like the Gauck Authority and later the 
Haus am Checkpoint Charlie sought to challenge and even revise this charge by forging a 
new identity for Germany. 
Economy was also a factor in the inability to commemorate 1989. Berlin was a 
city focused on rebuilding itself after decades of division. Instead of focusing on painful 
events of the past, it was more interested in building for the future, indeed, “The key 
word of New Berlin is normalization, not memorialization.”
51
 This static, anti-memorial 
status could not last in Berlin, however, because in any society, questions about the 
present-day’s relationship with the national past will arise. The past must always inform 
the present, even if that past is glossed over and reinvented to fit the ethos of the day. 




The famed Gauck Authority was a central organization created to determine how 
Germany would remember its Communist past, and would later serve as the model for 
the Polish Institute of National Remembrance.
53
 As an institute dedicated to memory, the 
Gauck Authority acted as a bridge between the memory void of immediate post-1989 
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years and the period of reverential remembering that would follow. Perhaps most notable 
for its archival division, which allows researchers to view former Stasi (East German 
secret police) files, the Gauck Authority also served a political function. The first 
commission, established by the Bundestag in 1992, was tasked with inquiring into the 
“history and consequences of Socialist dictatorship in Germany.”
54
 A Second 
Commission was established in 1995 with a similar purpose, and its findings directly 
impacted, or perhaps reflected, the nation’s views on memorialization.  
The second commission advocated for a Federal Memorial Program to be placed 
in charge of funding and constructing “monuments recalling the horrors of both German 
dictatorships.”
55
 While this program never came to full fruition, the Gauck Authority 
continued to have a major impact on the development of German national memory, 
particularly for its methods in approaching the study of the Stasi archives.  
Several laws passed in the early 1990s were meant to help facilitate research into 
the Stasi files. In 1991, the Bundestag passed the Statute on Stasi Files, which defined 
rules on access to the Stasi files, such as an odd anonymization process that placed the 
“selection of research materials into the hands of untrained lay people.”
56
 Through this 
system, a researcher would place a request for files, which would then be retrieved and 
compiled by an authority archivist and brought back to the researcher. Two problems lie 
in the way. First, Stasi files were not compiled alphabetically by the name of their 
subject, which would have made retrieval and review significantly easier; rather, they 
                                                 
54
 Inga Markovits, “Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and 
Forget about the Past-The Case of East Germany,” Law & Society Review. 35, no.3 
(September 2001), 517. 
55
 Ibid, 517.  
56
 Ibid, 541. 
 36 
were compiled by date of birth, which required archivists to utilize personal judgment as 
to which files were appropriate to include. 
 This led to the second problem, which is the type of information that was brought 
to researchers. Because discretion was given to archivists as to what information to 
provide researchers, frequently only the most scandalous information was being brought 
out. Poorly trained archivists were left to interpret what was important, and in doing so 
often gravitated toward the sensational rather than the seemingly mundane, when in fact 
those everyday commonalities of life in the GDR were precisely what researchers were 
looking for.  In practice, this statute “facilitates investigations of the scandalous and 
hinders research into the ‘normal’ impact of Stasi activities (if we can ever [call] the Stasi 
‘normal’).”
57
 The selective process leading to only the dissemination of mainly 
sensationalist material has contributed to the view of the GDR as an “Unrechts staat.”
58
 
The 1992 Law Amending the Federal Law on Archives had a similar impact on 
the control of information coming from the Gauck Authority. This law exempted the 
“Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR” from a thirty-year grace 
period that still protected comparable documents from West Germany. The result is an 
abundance of free information from the former GDR, but practically nothing from West 
Germany. The result of this dilemma is that “the history of Socialism in East Germany – 
already filled with shocking events – appears all the more shocking when set against the 
discreet background of West Germany’s past.”
59
 Intentionally or otherwise, legal 
structures regarding the dissemination of information from archives of both East and 
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West Germany in the immediate aftermath of reunification created a system that was 
inherently inclined to protect the memory of West Germany. The sins of East Germany, 
but not its normalcy, were made far more apparent, and far more accessible to 
researchers. For all of the real good that it has done, the transparency of the Gauck 
Authority is less than it may appear to be. The Gauck Authority provides a great open 
resource to research the Stasi, but it is not neutral in its impact on memory formation, in 
that it serves to enforce the memories of the Western winners. This officially sponsored 
view of the East German security apparatus and how it impacted life in the GDR had a 
direct influence on the sorts of imagery and ideology that would become more apparent 
and accessible in Berlin starting in the 21
st
 Century, and would be reflected most clearly 
by the Freiheitsmahnmal and Haus am Checkpoint Charlie.  
In respect to previous attempts to memorialize the end of Communism, 
particularly compared with the Übergange competition, Alexandra Hildebrandt’s 
Freiheitsmahnmal was something completely different. Instead of drawing on the 
plurality of experiences of life in divided Berlin, Hildebrandt’s field of 1065 wooden 
crosses, each denoting a victim of wall violence, sitting in front of a reconstructed section 
of  the Berlin Wall, fit squarely into the Western conception of East Berliners as being 
either victims of perpetrators, a belief mirrored within the structures of the Gauck 
Authority.
60
 The Freiheitsmahnmal gave tourists something that they had been wanting 
but desperately lacked: a centralized spot that fit their view of the wall, from which to 
remember wall victims. They responded in droves. In the brief time that it existed, it 
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became the favorite central spot for tourists. It did not hurt that Haus am Checkpoint 
Charlie, the museum of which Hildebrandt is the director, was located next door.  
Freiheitsmahnmal was a site of “highly ritualized memory,” with a wreath laid for 
every victim and “every cross…blessed by a Catholic priest.”
61
 Importantly, 
Freiheitsmahnmal was Hildebrandt’s attempt to strike out at the fact that there was no 
formal centralized place from which to remember the wall. Up to that point, Übergänge 
had been the only attempt at memorialization by the Berlin Senate. At the same time, 
other victimized groups, particularly Jews, were finally breaking ground on having 
centralized, official locations of their own, including the new Jewish Museum and the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. So Freiheitsmahnmal was an attempt to give 
wall victims their due.  
Also unlike Übergänge, Freiheitsmahnmal was a privately funded memorial. 
Rather than the result of a competition, with a panel of jurors in an attempt at 
acknowledging all points of view, Freiheitsmahnmal was backed by corporate and 
political organizations with a very specific point to press. It also gained notoriety because 
it was only a temporary exhibition, as the land on which Hildebrandt constructed the 
memorial was leased from a bank. Hildebrandt and her supporters, a collection of 
victims’ families, conservative CDU politicians, and German-American advocates 
(including Daimler-Chrysler), unleashed a media campaign to get the bank 
conglomeration Bankaktiengesellschaft (BAG) to allow the site to remain in existence. 
BAG, in turn, wished for Hildebrandt to either renew the lease or purchase the site. 
Coincidentally, the original date of demolition was scheduled for July 4, 2005, American 
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Independence Day. Though the mayor of Berlin generally avoided the conversation 
surrounding Freiheitsmahnmal, when asked about the demolition date, his spokesperson 
Michael Donnermeyer responded, “If it is true that the demolition will happen on Fourth 
of July, this would be mediawise imprudent. One should at least postpone the day.”
62
  
A brochure from Haus am Checkpoint Charlie made no mistake about the target 
audience of the Freiheitsmahnmal. Included in it is a letter from Michael Inacker, an 
executive at Daimler-Chrysler, “a German-American company,” to Joachen Lehnhoff, 
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors at BAG, proclaiming the merits of Checkpoint 
Charlie and asking if they could come to an amicable solution.
63
 There is also a document 
from GOP Germany asking its members to donate to keep the memorial alive. For a 
donation of US$250, members could receive a Republicans Abroad “Cufflink/Lapel Pin 
Set & Genuine piece of the Berlin Wall.”
64
 
Perhaps as could be expected, there were many critics of Freiheitsmahnmal. In 
her letter about the importance of keeping the memorial open, Hildebrandt spent most of 
the time stressing the importance of Checkpoint Charlie, including many of its famous 
visitors. Some critics claimed that the way in which the memorial was created suggested 
that many of the victims had died at Checkpoint Charlie, which is of course untrue. In 
fact, the actual deaths of some of the victims, which Hildebrandt did not limit to just 
victims killed at the wall, are still in dispute.
65
 What Freiheitsmahnmal accomplished was 
establishing a centralized location for wall tourism. Even though the memorial itself is 
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gone, Haus am Checkpoint Charlie still thrives and serves as an important stop for 
tourists.  
Freiheitsmahnmal also got the Berlin Senate moving, and within the year it 
created a plan to centralize tourism around the massive 1.4km long Berlin Wall Memorial 
along the Bernauer Straße.
66
 This facility attempts to straddle the line between 
Freiheitsmahnmal and Übergänge, creating a centralized space for Wall tourism with a 
clear message, while at the same time trying to allow visitors space for personal 
reflection to attempt to understand the wall on their own terms.  
 Since the end of the Freiheitsmahnmal drama, there has been little ceremony 
surrounding the end of Communism in Germany, with the obvious exception of the 
twentieth anniversary celebration, which was generally positive. This shift is reflective of 
political changes in Germany. Politically and economically, Germany has been one of the 
most stable countries in Europe in recent years. This position has done a good deal to 
hamper major political divisiveness, which, apart from space and historical overlap, is 
one of the most major factors to impact identity formation. A more salient example of 
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II. Warsaw Remembers 
A. Background      
 
Commemorations of 1989 in Poland followed a different arc than in Germany. In part 
this is due to the nature of Poland’s transition from Communism, which was not subject 
to the complications of reunification; however, perhaps the more important theme that 
separated Polish and German commemorations were the unintended consequences of the 
negotiated reforms following the Round Table Negotiations.  
 Post-1989 Polish commemorations can be defined by two general time periods. 
The first, which comprised most of the 1990s, was a fallow period for commemoration. 
There were virtually no state-sponsored attempts to commemorate, the reasons for this 
being attention to the struggling economy and democracy-building, and a purposeful 
effort to shy away from remembering Communism under the post-Communist presidency 
of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Modest attempts were made at the private or local level, 
usually in the form of new statues or the removal of Communist era statuary.  
 The second and much more potent era of commemorations began with the 
creation of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej or IPN) 
by the Polish parliament in the late 1990s. Initially dedicated as a research organization 
and archive housing the entirety of former security service archives, the IPN was meant 
to produce academic work bringing to light atrocities committed during the Nazi and 
Communist periods of modern Polish history, and if possible bring perpetrators to justice. 
By 2005, the influence and power the IPN was radically altered by the incoming right-
wing Law and Justice party headed by the Kaczynski brothers, former Solidarity activists 
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disillusioned by what they perceived as the failures of post-Solidarity and post-
Communist leaders to bring “morality” back to Polish politics. Under their leadership, the 
IPN ballooned to incorporate a powerful new lustration bureau which sought to root out 
from public service anyone who may have collaborated with the Security Service and 
expose them to the public. The controversies that followed these efforts will be discussed 
in detail, as their outcomes have proved highly consequential in Polish politics. 
 Yet another significant difference between German and Polish commemorations 
exists, and that is the absence of physical commemorative space. If Germany followed 
the maxim that space is crucial to identity formation, Poland proves that space alone is 
not the final arbiter in shaping identity. This is not to claim that Poland does not have its 
own important spaces. In Gdansk there are the shipyards where the Solidarity strikes 
began, but that space reflects the beginning of a movement and not the end of 
communism. Warsaw, too, has its spaces, and as this study will mostly look at 
commemorations within the Polish capital, where the Round Table Negotiations 
occurred, a look at identity spaces is also necessary. However, Warsaw has nothing akin 
to the Berlin Wall. There are structures in Warsaw that serve as reminders of the 
Communist past, key among these the Palace of Culture and Science, but again, this 
structure is indicative of one period of Polish history, and does not incorporate quite the 
same level of overlap as the Berlin Wall. It was not symbolic of the downfall of 
communism in Poland, which happened much less gradually than in Germany, and 
though it sits over an area crucial to the Second World War period, few physical remains 
of that event can be found anywhere in the city.  
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 The following discussion will be devoted to the creation of new memory spaces in 
Poland, particularly within Warsaw. These spaces generally take the form of monuments, 
which come in different forms. Some are completely new creations, erected after the end 
of communism to reflect an idealized event or hero from the national past. Others are 
replacement monuments, taking over spaces previously held by Polish Communist or 
Soviet monuments. Another form of new identity space is the conspicuous absence of 
monuments. In these cases, former Polish Communist or Soviet monuments were 
destroyed, but were not replaced. Often in instances like these, the base of the monument 
still remains, a testament to the identity of a previous era. This particular brand of 
commemoration was most prevalent in the period immediately following the end of 
communism, when there was little in the way of official commemorations. 
 Later forms of commemoration would revolve around the Institute of National 
Remembrance, and its use by politicians to directly influence Polish identity. This latter 
phenomenon, which differs from the way in which the Gauck Authority was used in 
Germany, is directly linked to the end of communism and the transition period. Critical to 
this is how differently Poland and East Germany came to restoring a multi-party system.  
Poland’s path to 1989 began earlier than East Germany’s. True, the history of 
both countries, intertwined because of their wartime experiences, means that both nations 
shared some aspects of the communist era. Yet the actual groundwork for Poland’s 
eventual break with the Communist Party began between 1979 and 1981. There had been 
periods of unrest in Poland before then, resulting in the loss of life of Polish citizens, but 
none of these had been successful in actually making sweeping changes to the 
government. At most, Poland was left with the freedom to apply its own brand of national 
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communism and to have a greater say in its own domestic affairs, something which 
protestors in Hungary in 1956 looked to when they staged their own failed revolt.  
 Possibly the most important aspect of these previous crises was the guidance they 
provided for those who would come later. When the trade union Solidarity formed in 
Gdansk, its leaders, many of whom had witnessed or even been a part of the strikes of 
1970-71, formed new strategies based around the hard lessons they had previously 
learned. In effect, they were making sure that they took advantage of previous 
experiences in order to ensure a much greater chance for success.  
 The election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (later Pope John Paul II) to the papacy in 
1978, the first Polish pope and first non-Italian pope in several centuries, would become 
one of the first stepping-stones in Poland’s path to reform.
67
 As a deeply devout Catholic 
nation, there had always been tensions between the Catholics and Communists. One can 
see how trouble could be created in a society where there was a large base of Catholic 
workers mixing with the nominally atheist ruling party. Especially furthering the 
country’s aims at greater freedom was John Paul II’s first papal visit to his native Poland 
in 1979. Standing in Warsaw’s Victory Square in front of a crowd of thousands, the pope 
boldly proclaimed: 
“We stand here near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In the distant and contemporary 
annals of Poland, that tomb has had its foundation and justification. In so many different 
places on their native soil soldiers fell in battle. In ever so many places in Europe and the 
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world their death proclaimed that there can be no just Europe without an independent 
Poland on its map.”
68
 
 The pope’s words did not fall on deaf ears. The Polish people heard in the Pope’s 
remarks as further legitimization of their cause, which inspired reformers to carry on the 
work that had been left aside in 1970 and picked up by KOR, after Gierek’s policies of 




 By 1980, workers in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk were ready to push for one of 
the main demands of 1970, which had been for the establishment of an independent trade 
union. Strikes began in June 1980 across the country, but most were fairly short-lived. 
The strikes would not touch the Lenin Shipyard until August, since strike organizers 
could not persuade the other workers. All of that changed, however, when a crane 
operator named Anna Walentynowicz was laid off.  
Walentynowicz had been a popular worker who was outspoken against 
corruption, and her unfair sacking gave organizers the impetus they needed to persuade 
their fellow workers to strike.
70
 Among their demands were that both Walentynowicz and 
another popular worker, an electrician named Lech Walesa who had been laid off in 
1976, be allowed to return to work. The strike nearly collapsed when the manager of the 
yard promised that he would be willing to negotiate with the workers if they would return 
to work, but it was just at that moment when Lech Walesa jumped up next to him and 
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spoke to the crowd.
71
 The strikes continued, with Walesa taking the leading role, and 
soon workers from across Poland had resumed their strikes. On August 17, 1980 the 
Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, led by Walesa, released a list of twenty-one 
demands, the first of which was the establishment of an independent trade union.
72
 The 
demands eventually led to the Gdańsk Agreement and the formation of the independent 
trade union Solidarity.  
 From those beginnings Solidarity would grow into a massive force. It was 
recognized internationally, and became a symbol in the western world, which viewed 
Solidarity as the people of the Communist bloc finally taking a stand against their 
leaders. From the Pope’s Warsaw visit to the emergence and actions of Solidarity, there 
were growing signs that Poles were simply fed up with the Communist government and 
were finally going to act against it. The provocations of Solidarity were serious enough 
for Polish Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski to declare a state of martial law in 
December 1981, violently cracking down on Solidarity and the opposition protestors. For 
nearly a decade, until 1989, Poland would see a period of repression followed by attempts 
to reform, but it would also experience growing and new forms of opposition. This 
resulted in a curious situation in which both Solidarity and the ruling party were in a 
weak position, forcing the party to invite Solidarity to the negotiating table in order to 
strike a deal regarding a round of multi-party elections. From there, Solidarity went on to 
an almost clean sweep of the seats for which it posted a candidate, establishing June 4, 
1989 as the day that saw the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe since 
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World War II. Coincidentally, the positive news of the Polish elections was marred by 
one thing that day: the Tiananmen Square massacre.  
 In Polish commemorations of 1989, there is one keyword that reappears more 
than any other: Solidarity. The famous red logo has become more than a symbol of anti-
communist opposition, but also of Poland itself. When celebrating the collapse of 
communism in their country, Poles tend to identify so strongly with Solidarity that it 
becomes easy to think that Solidarity alone managed the force the communists into 
negotiations. This is not the case. Any reasonable person cannot deny Solidarity’s 
importance. It was the strongest and best organized movement against communism in all 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Its influence expanded so much that sister organizations 
developed throughout the communist countries of Europe, and some even grew in 
Western Europe as well.
73
 And, of course, there is the fact that during the Round Table 
negotiations, the opposition was represented by Solidarity, and the first non-communist 
elected officials in Poland had a Solidarity background. To give Solidarity the spotlight in 
any celebration of the end of Polish communism seems obvious enough; however, 
perhaps that spotlight is sometimes too strong.  
  After martial law was declared, Solidarity was forced underground. Its 
leaders were rounded up and imprisoned, or strictly monitored in their homes. With 
Solidarity made illegal, its leaders were at a real loss to make the same kind of difference 
as they had in 1980 and 1981.   It might have influenced those who were out in the street 
seeking change, but it did not create new policy on its own. In effect, the efforts that 
Solidarity had begun were now picked up and carried on by new groups. Along with the 
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new groups came new causes. Some were in favor of environmental change, others 
wanted a reform to the compulsory military service system or new alcohol control 
policies and so on. Many of the new movements were spearheaded by a new generation 
as well.
74
 They felt that Solidarity, while important as the beginning of people-power 
movements in Poland, did not belong to their generation, that of young students and 
workers. These groups took an active part throughout the 1980s in taking their message 
to the people and championing democratic reforms. Because of their efforts, they 
managed to get more reformers into the ruling party, and from there the party invited 
Solidarity to sit down at the Round Table. Within two months, the two sides, both of 
whom were considered weak at the time, managed to put together a deal in which 
Solidarity was legalized and which allowed for contested elections in June 1989. The 
Communists may have thought that they could still work out a way to maintain control of 
the government, but they were proven wrong. When the election came, Solidarity won 
almost every contested seat that was on the ballot.
75
  
 In 1998, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Round Table, the University of 
Michigan hosted one of the most impressive commemorative events in the world, an 
event that would bring together members from both sides of the Round Table, including 
many controversial and high profile figures. Their hope was simply to analyze the 
decision-making process that brought both parties to the table. The commemoration’s 
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organizers could not have expected the backlash that their event received, a reaction that 
illustrates the difficulty that memory can play in the comprehension of historical events. 
In this case, the furor came mostly from the Right, and from Poles still living in Poland as 
well as those in the United States. The bulk of the criticism revolved around the fact that 
there was a fear of legitimizing the role of the Communist party by allowing people like 
Jaruzelski to share equal space with Walesa, never mind the fact that both men played an 
important role in bringing about the negotiations.
76
 There were also some grumblings 
from those who believed that the negotiations had “sold out” Poland, in a manner of 
speaking. These fears rested in a belief that by dealing with the communists, Solidarity 
had assured its own place by abandoning the positions of others. Basically, the “pinks and 
the reds,” or Solidarity and the Communists, had made a deal that excluded other points 
of view. These voices wanted it made clear that there were other opposition groups active 
in Poland, not just Solidarity, but they were excluded from the bargaining table unjustly 
in their opinion. Also, they felt concern that an unusually large number of former 
members of the party were allowed to participate in the new government. In effect, the 
old elites had become the new ones.
77
 
 For some of the historians involved in the conference, this uproar over what they 
believed would be a non-controversial conference raised questions as to who exactly was 
writing the history that they were supposed to be giving a fair assessment of. It is the 
historian’s job to always be unbiased, but in this instance, it was realized that try as he 
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might, a historian creates history just by defining what is important and what is not.
78
 Despite the historians’ best efforts, their attempts at an unbiased approach to 1989 
would ultimately prove futile, because by making the choice, consciously or 
unconsciously, to exclude specific elements of the Polish revolution from their 
commemoration, they were placing one point of view, one narrative, firmly above 
another. This is not an uncommon aspect of understanding history as a collection of 
narratives; in fact, it is the day-to-day reality of it. But whereas the historian may 
recognize his predicament and attempt to find a remedy, such recognition is less 
forthcoming in the realm of public commemoration, where a created narrative in the 
service of collective memory is frequently the point. 
 The Michigan incident is a perfect example of Michel Rolph Troulliot’s 
“silences” in history. The post-modernist ideal surrounding this theory is that, as the 
Michigan historians alluded to, history is created as much by the absent spaces in time as 
by those we remember.
79
 Collective memory is highly selective, and only those things 
which are applicable to current ways of thinking will be remembered by the group, even 
if it is the case that an individual’s memory recalls something different. In Michigan, two 
opposing memories squared off against one another. It would be improper to call either 
illegitimate, since to those who believe in them, the memories are true. But both 
conspicuously rely only on the individual memories applicable to the collective memory 
of the adherent. 
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Discussing the commemorations of 1989 in Poland is an altogether different task 
than in the case of Germany. Poland, for instance, does not have the benefit of a single, 
physical object to commemorate, like the Berlin Wall. It had the Round Table, but as a 
symbol that does not have the same dramatic impact that the wall had in Berlin, where it 
was a permanent institution for nearly three decades. Instead of one, dramatic event, 
Poland had a decade-long organized push to revolution, beginning with KOR and the 
Solidarity movement.  
 In addition to the absence of a space on which to pin its commemorations, Poland 
suffered an immediate crisis in leadership after its transition to a democratic government. 
This impacted the foundations of the government so much that it split apart the Solidarity 
movement, the result of which was to question the legitimacy of some of its top public 
figures. With the former opposition split into factions, there was less chance of consensus 
among leadership at the top, leading to a decreased likelihood of centralized memorials 
pertaining to 1989.  
A major contributing factor to commemorative life in Warsaw is the Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowe (IPN), established by the anti-Communist Solidarity Electoral Action 
government in 1998.
80
 Originally intended to prevent “wild lustration,” the Institute was 
first charged with the task of organizing and maintaining the former Communist security 
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 Over time, though, it has become something else. After the creation of a 
Lustration Bureau in 2005-2006 by the right wing anti-Communist Law and Justice 
Party, the Institute played a central role in providing material to the vetting of candidates 
“standing for public office or belonging to key professions.”
82
  
 The Instytut Pamięci Narodowej plays another important role in Polish 
commemorative life. Because of its status as an official keeper of modern Polish 
memory, it is charged with the task of shaping how Poland should remember its past. For 
the most part, IPN deals with the Polish experience under Nazi occupation and crimes 
under Communism. However, because of its role in dealing with life under Communism, 
it must also deal with 1989.  
 Commemorating 1989 in Poland is difficult for two reasons. The first is that 
Poland does not have its wall moment in the same way Germany does. There was no one 
pervasive symbol in Polish society whose destruction would merit a series of memorials, 
except of course for communism itself. The second reason is the fact that Poles are still 
divided on the issue of the break with communism. While a majority may have accepted 
the Round Table negotiations and the elections of 1989 as a success and a full departure 
from the past, others, especially those on the Right who did not participate in the 
negotiations, have been more inclined to decry the negotiations as not enough.  
 After 1989, the successful anti-Communists who assumed power believed that the 
“Round Table negotiations of 1989 had embodied a sufficient denial of totalitarianism.”
83
 
At first, or at least until 2005 before the Law and Justice government, acts to purge 
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Communists through a formal policy of decomunizacja were discouraged. In fact, 
Communists were allowed to rejoin the political system, under a new name, and 
participate in public life. Amongst the most prominent of these former communists was 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, elected President in 1995.
84
  
 But all was not well in Poland, because for many on the Right, memory was not 
satisfied. Poland had just come through a long period of national suffering, and there 
were people who felt that the only true revolution was not a negotiated one, but one in 
which the people triumphed dramatically over the oppressor. In other words, anti-
Communist groups that did not participate in the Round Table negotiations “did not 
accept the logic of compromise, did not believe that the negotiated settlements could 
provide an appropriate anti-Communist mythology for a new national memory.”
85
  
 For the IPN, the agency tasked with remembering crimes of the Nazi and Soviet 
regimes, there needed to be more substance to successfully satiate all parties involved. 
Therefore, after the tenth anniversary of the Round Table, the IPN launched a memorial 
campaign that “avoided the story of elite-level reconciliations that underpinned the 




 The IPN followed suit with a similar campaign in 2009 titled It All Began in 
Poland. By saying “It all began,” the IPN was not merely referring to 1989 and the 
Round Table and June 4
th
 elections, but rather the whole crux of 20
th
 Century history. It 
draws a direct line from 1939-1989, fifty years of history, through Poland. What began in 
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the Second World War, when Germany invaded Poland, ended in 1989, when Poland’s 
successful opposition won a groundbreaking election in Poland’s parliamentary election, 
setting the stage for other countries to follow suit.  
 Through its efforts to bring multiple decades of Polish history into one story, the 
IPN used historical overlap much in the same way that Germans drew a direct line from 
the Topography of Terror and the Berlin Holocaust Memorial to the Berlin Wall. By 
drawing on a fifty-year period instead of 1989 alone, the IPN allowed Poles enough space 
to remember as they see fit. It also allowed them to draw on a favorite figure of Polish 
memory, the Polish national hero, specifically wartime heroes. For this, there is a long 
tradition.  
Commemorations have been imbedded in the national consciousness of Poland 
since the failure of the uprisings of the 19
th
 century made them the greatest showcase for 
Polish nationalism. The downfall of the Polish state and the tripartite partition of Poland 
between Imperial Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and Prussia left Poland in the tenuous 
position of being a stateless nation. In order to cope with this situation and retain a 
heritage and culture that was divided among three very different administrative bodies, 




Without a state to call their own, Poles in the late 19
th
 Century were often left 
with little or no formal education in Polish history.
88
 Commemorations were necessary in 
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order to determine who was Polish, and what it meant to be Polish. In effect, 
commemorations defined the nation.  
 This trend was carried on into the 20
th
 Century, and is still in practice. For example, 
one of the most unusual but informative scenes that occurred in 1989 was a performance 
piece put on by none other than Lech Walesa. After the Round Table Negotiations paved 
the way for semi-free elections on June 4
th
, Solidarity set into motion a massive voter 
turnout drive to ensure that it won as many of the seats that it was up for as possible. The 
“High Noon” campaign poster was a famous part of this effort, as was Walesa’s photo 
campaign in which he had his picture taken with every Solidarity candidate. Juxtaposed 
to this relatively conservative election campaign was Walesa’s May 14
th
 spectacle in 




 Walesa’s performance focused on Polish hero Tadeusz Kościuszko’s victory 
against Russian troops on the battlefield of Racławice on April 4
th
, 1794. Though 
Kościuszko ultimately lost his bid for Polish independence, his enlightenment ideals and 
the popular image of his scythe-armed peasant army endeared him to many Poles in their 
years of partition. In 1989, Walesa came to the stage at Racławice in a horse-drawn 
carriage, wearing a traditional sukmana. He took the stage and sang patriotic songs, 
“brandishing an upright scythe.”
90
 At the height of the pageantry, he proclaimed the 
importance of voting in every Solidarity candidate, saying “It’s time to replace scythes 
with ballots. . . . Never before did so much depend on you. The job of mobilizing society 
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is in your hands. The government has granted us pluralism. . . . You must join the effort 
to build a new Poland, or else a new Poland will be built by others.”
91
  
 Over twenty years after 1989, Polish memorials still focus on the important role 
that Solidarity played in bringing about the beginning of the negotiated revolutions of 
1989. Especially important is Poland’s role as the progenitor of the movement. Any 
attempt to claim otherwise can be greeted with hostility, as in the case of a bitter 2009 
article in the Krakow Post. Musing on the year’s upcoming celebrations, the media outlet 
mockingly jibed, “CNN is working on a series about 1989 titled ‘Autumn of Change,’ 
and that’s significant because, even in southern Poland, early June is hardly autumn.”
92
 
  While the IPN has been discussed, and a few examples have been given to 
demonstrate some of its contributions to Polish commemorations, there is a great deal 
more to understand about this institution that has arguably more power in Polish society 
than the Gauck Authority has in Germany. It did not begin life as such a monolithic 
structure, but was allowed to become one as political changes swept through Poland in 
the early part of the 21
st
 Century.  
  What motivating factors can explain the rise of IPN and its grip on official memory 
and commemoration more than a decade after the end of communism in Poland? 
Beginning in the immediate aftermath of Solidarity’s success, the new government turned 
its attention to matters other than commemorations. Poland in the 1990s was a land in 
transition, hampered by a struggling economy. There was little time for the government 
to set aside money for commemorative programs when the economy needed to be rebuilt 




 “Twenty Years On,” Krakow Post, June 3, 2009. 
http://www.krakowpost.com/article/1342 
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virtually from the ground up. A focus on the economy was not the only factor in keeping 
the government from remembering the past. There was also the matter of state-building to 
cope with. Poland of the 1990s was very much following Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s policy 
of drawing a “thick line” between the communist past and the democratic present.
93
 
There would be no time to remember, only to rebuild. The antithesis of this theme was 
what PiS would seize upon when they came to power in 2005. 
 Poland was a country that had not experienced democracy since the 1920s, nor a 
sovereign government since 1939, and many of its Sejm and Senat members had never 
held elected office, let alone positions of national prominence. The newness of the 
government meant that there was a natural learning curve that had to be dealt with. 
Likewise, the electoral system was imperfect at best. In the October 1991 elections, the 
fractious nature of the new democracy led to the election to at least one seat for members 
of twenty-nine different parties.
94
 Turnout in that election only reached 43.2 percent.
95
 A 
characteristic of these early elections was also the number of “wasted votes,” votes cast 
for a party that did not gain a seat in the parliament. In 1993, this number was an 
astonishingly high 34.9 percent.
96
 The difficulty of the electoral system led to a number 
of changes over the decade, with the government cycling through a variety of voting 
methods before finally ending with a system which reasonably eliminated wasted votes 
while allowing for a proportionally representative system, though there was a natural 
conglomeration of factions over time resulting in fewer but more powerful political 
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parties. Amongst these parties was PiS, the right-wing party headed by the Kaczynski 
brothers, which gained its highest prominence and greatest success at the ballot box in 
2005, earning control over both the presidency and parliament. It was the PiS government 
that would successfully utilize the IPN in its campaign to rewrite memory of the 
Communist era in Poland as a period of victims and perpetrators, assuming what is called 
the “prosecutor’s attitude,” most meaningfully expressed in its “Fourth Republic” 
ideology.
97
 The PiS government represented the zenith of public attempts to 
commemorate 1989 and establish a unified national memory.
98
 
 The PiS platform was also indicative of another problem that had plagued Polish 
politics since the Walesa presidency; that is, the specter of Solidarity’s post-Communism 
“war at the top.”  
 Solidarity’s enormous influence on modern politics is incontrovertible. Apart 
from Kwasniewski, every Polish president since the beginning of the Third Republic has 
claimed Solidarity ties, as do many other prominent politicians. Solidarity’s struggle 
against the Communist regime impacted the rest of Europe and still stands as a testament 
to what can be accomplished by the power of a united populace. Yet in Poland, 
Solidarity’s legacy is still being shaped. The extraordinary circumstances of Solidarity’s 
formation are in part to blame for this predicament. As a political unit, Solidarity was 
created not by one core demographic, but by multiple groups, frequently with competing 
special interests. How it managed to overcome these differences is due to its main 
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mission of achieving “negative freedoms,” or the freedom from something rather than the 
freedom of something. The united goal of overthrowing the Communist power structure 
was more important at the time than gaining specific freedoms, thus Solidarity managed 
to supercede the separate interests of its left and right wings.  
 The sudden victory of Solidarity in the 1989 elections almost immediately 
changed the political landscape in Poland. Once it was assured that Solidarity would be 
allowed to seat its members in Parliament, and once the transition to power by the non-
Communist government was firmly in place, the need to maintain the unity of Solidarity 
was no longer a political necessity. Walesa immediately initiated his “war at the top,” 
alienating the left of the party, the intellectuals such as Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki and Adam Michnik, from the right of the party, those who took a strongly 
pro-Catholic, nationalistic stance.  
 Rather than cementing Solidarity’s legacy, this schism had the effect of muddling 
Solidarity’s status in Polish historical consciousness. It was no longer a purely positive 
force in recent Polish memory. Even Walesa, the Nobel Prize recipient, had his legacy 
tarnished. According to Susan Pearce, “When asked who is the greatest figure in Polish 
history, Walesa tops the list. When asked who is the worst figure in Polish history, 
Walesa again tops the list.”
99
 The fractious relationship between the former allies led to 
conflicting narratives Solidarity’s memory, which would not be fully explored until years 
after 1989, due to the struggle to reform the economy and the victory of the post-
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Communists in elections in the 1990s, who simply did not wish to remember the impact 
of Solidarity in dismantling Communist Poland.  
 The inability of Solidarity to maintain its cohesion led to a long period of public 
silence in terms of remembering modern Polish history. Because of this, there was little 
in the way of major public demonstrations celebrating the collapse of Communism. 
Instead, the citizens and leaders of towns and cities carried out memory work at the local 
level. Most of this memory work took the form of changing street names and dismantling 
Communist era statuary.  
 The existence of Soviet war memorials was a virtual memory minefield 
throughout Poland, from urban centers to rural communities. Despite the early lack of 
government uniformity in creating a policy to address memory and commemoration, 
“Solidarity’s electorate was demanding a dramatic change to the urban landscape that 
would reflect the rapid post-communist transformation which was taking place in the 
country.”
100
 The successful local government reforms gave them power and the elections 
of May 1990 gave local leaders the impetus to quickly address or correct memory issues 
in their own communities, which meant that the Soviet war memorials, of which it seems 
every city had at least one in a prominent location, were the most obvious candidates to 
receive major concentration. This particularly meant the destruction of the monuments, 
which most Poles did not hold in very high esteem. There were some cases in which the 
destruction of monuments did not occur as a result of the actions of the local 
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governments, but instead due to acts of “clumsy dismantling” through “the condition of 
the monuments or acts of vandalism.”
101
  
Interestingly for the fate of the Soviet monuments, those that tended to be 
destroyed were usually the political monuments that held some prominent location with 
the city. Another type of monument, those which memorialized not the Red Army as a 
liberating force, but the individual Red Army soldiers, were frequently left untouched or 
relocated elsewhere. In the case that such monuments were erected in Red Army 
graveyards, the monuments were often allowed to remain in place. In 2007, when 
memory politics was in its full swing in Poland, a debate arose in an effort to decide the 
fate of any remaining Red Army memorials. During the debates, “the Polish heritage of 
Christian faith and traditions was invoked to question the initiative of relocating the 
remaining Red Army monuments.”
102
 The Bishop of the Polish Army, Archbishop 
Slawoj Leszek Glodz, “appealed for respect and honour for the dead soldiers, stating that 
‘any soldier’s blood has one color and one price.’”
103
 Even PiS, whose platform centered 
on Polish nationalism and was inherently opposed to positively remembering the exploits 
of Red Army soldiers in liberating Poland from German occupation, took a stance that 
called for moderation in the case of Red Army monuments. It “tried hard to disengage the 
issue of the removal of the monuments from the issue of the fallen soldiers” and claimed 
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that there were “no plans to remove any monuments from cemeteries.”
104
 PiS based this 
policy on of its strongly Polish Catholic tradition that emphasizes a strong respect for the 




The tendency towards destruction of Communist monumentalism was coupled 
with a focus on national ideological renewal in the form of erecting new and pre-
Communist monuments, often reusing the bases of very Communist monuments that 
were being replaced. An effort to replace the Communist monuments with new non-
Communist ones was an act of redefining new memory structures. Constructing new 
monuments on the bases of old ones “was needed to complete the act of obliteration,” 
thereby symbolically removing the Communist hold over public spaces.
106
 Erecting the 
new monuments also provided a “focal point for commemorations…the key factor 
behind the erection of new monuments.”
107
  Additionally, reuse of the monumental base 
did not permanently erase the old monument. Instead, “the signs of erasure became 
permanently visible and opened to future interpretations.”
108
 
The national capital, Warsaw, was perhaps the most prodigious creator of new 
monuments in the post-Soviet era. After the destruction of most of Warsaw during the 
Second World War, Warsaw presented itself to the Soviets as a blank canvas, ripe for 
reconstruction as a model city in the Communist East. Its new buildings were dedicated 
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to the notion of function over form, and perhaps its most famous building also became its 
most famous monument, the Palace of Culture and Science, a massive tribute to Socialist 
Realist architecture that mirrored the Seven Sisters of Moscow. Following the end of 
Communism in 1989, Warsaw again became the target of reconstruction, though on a 
different scale. New building projects were undertaken, but since the city had not been 
leveled as in the case of post-war Warsaw, much of the reconstruction came in the form 
of monuments. In the words of Katrin Van Cant, “monuments are highly fitting and 
representative in the project of reconstruction because, more so than books and other 
written historical publications, they are the first point of contact with history for an 
average Pole or typical foreigner/tourist.”
109
 
Like the rest of Poland, which had seen over two thousand Soviet monuments and 
plaques removed post-1989, Warsaw saw the destruction of eleven statues between 1989 
and 1998.
110
 To counterbalance the destruction of old monuments, and to begin a new 
period of reconstruction in the history of Warsaw, a massive campaign of new monument 
construction began in the capital. Between 1989 and 2006, a total of seventy-six new 
monuments were raised.
111
 Continuing to mirror the rest of the country, the monuments 
in Warsaw often tackled a very specific set of subjects. More often than not, the subjects 
of Warsaw’s monuments were individual Poles of groups of Poles from history, with few 
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exceptions no later than the Second World War. All of these Poles were considered to be 
national heroes who helped defend the Polish nationality or in some way fought for 
independence. Not surprisingly, then, most of the historical Poles came from times when 
Poland was either partitioned or under wartime occupation, times with a negative 
connotation. The number of statues dedicated to periods that had positive connotations, 
like the First World War, after which Poland gained independence and established the 
Second Republic, is relatively small.
112
 This dichotomy between the perceptions of actual 
successes and periods of Polish oppression gives credence to an internal belief of Polish 
martyrdom, an idea that figures prominently into the political platform of right-wing 
parties, particularly PiS, whose ideology centers around heroic but tragic Polish struggles, 
like the Home Army’s fight against the German war machine, and derides genuine 
political gains, like the Round Table Negotiations.  
 The very first monument to be erected in Warsaw following the June elections 
was the Memorial to the Warsaw Uprising Heroes, based on a subject that had long been 
taboo under the Communist government. In fact, the general suppression of memory of 
the activities of the Home Army in defending Poland during the war led to a great 
resurgence in its post-1989 memory, with almost 30% of all new monuments dedicated to 
the Second World War and the Home Army. Oddly, perhaps, is that the second 
monument to be constructed in 1989 was dedicated not to a Pole, but to George 
Washington. This monument was erected in time to greet the visit of President George 
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H.W. Bush to Poland, and was erected in gratitude to American support to Poland during 
the 1980s and its acceptance of “Polish political refugees.”
113
 Another American enjoys 
memorialization in Warsaw. A statue to Edward M. House, an adviser to Woodrow 
Wilson, was re-erected in 1991, forty years after Communists tore it down. House was “a 
noble spokesman for the Polish cause,” and played a role in helping Poland achieve its 
independence in the wake of the First World War.
114
  
In the seventeen-year window between 1989 and 2006, when a survey was made 
of Warsaw’s new monuments, one prominent period has been largely neglected. In 
keeping with the tendency to memorialize heroic deeds during times of oppression Polish 
history rather than times of peace or freedom, no monuments were erected to 
memorialize 1989. Anti-communist monuments exist, primarily in the guise of memorials 
to victims of Stalinist persecution, but statues with more positive connotations, 
particularly of 1989, were non-existent in the capital at this time. Of the many prominent 
Poles  actively fighting Communism in the 1980s who might merit memorialization only 




In the first decade after 1989, Poland was not a nation devoid of memory or 
commemoration, but the circumstances surrounding the formation of the new government 
and a focus on the struggling Polish economy, as well as the Polish effort to join the 
                                                 
113
 Ibid, 110.  
114
 Ibid, 110. The quotation is inscribed on the statue’s memorial plaque.  
115
 Ibid, 103. Popieluszko was actually a popular figure to memorialize in the 1990s. He 
was honored with two statues in 1996, one in 1999. A street name and a square were also 
named after him. One may contend that this says more about the man’s status as a martyr 
and a priest, both highly regarded in Polish culture, rather than his anti-Communist 
activities. After all, there were many other Poles regarded for their anti-Communist 
record who have received none of the public recognition awarded to Popieluszko.  
 66 
European Union, meant that there was a great divide between the government and its 
people in terms of how it was remembering the past, and how it wished to view its 
present. To be blunt, the Polish government, which was largely controlled by post-
Communists for much of the 1990s, avoided the issue of remembering, especially when it 
came to remembering 1989, which marked the ultimate failure of the Communist regime. 
The people, on the other hand, had been actively remembering the past in the form of 
destruction and construction of monuments. However, while commemoration was being 
channeled into one area, Poles were choosing to codify national memory around a distant 
past, rather than the recent events to which they had actual individual memories. This 
created a memory vacuum. There was no framework for understanding the successes and 
failures of 1989, leaving an interpretation of the negotiated settlements to open debate. 
The first group that would successfully attempt to address and shape national memory of 
1989 would be the far right parties, particularly PiS. Their tool for doing so would be the 
massive and incomparable government institution of the IPN.  
Like similar institutions in former Communist countries, the IPN has its roots in 
Poland’s necessity to have a centralized archive for the massive, unorganized collection 
of secret archives of the former regime. Having a central office to administer the archives 
would make it practical and exponentially easier for researchers and historians to begin 
studying files that would have been nearly impossible for them to access earlier. In this 
respect, the IPN is reminiscent of the Gauck Authority in Germany, and was initially 
imagined to serve a similar function. What sets the IPN apart from other archival 
repositories is the dual purpose it was given. Not only was the IPN to gather and make 
available the many kilometers of files from the former security service and intelligence 
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agencies, but it was also given the mission of investigating and prosecuting crimes 
committed by the Nazi occupiers and Communist government, making its scope of 
prosecution crimes committed between the years 1939 and 1990.
116
 
The IPN was not originally intended to take on a major political function, but 
rather to serve as an arbiter of Polish memory. By using its vast resources, the IPN would 
be able to organize at the national level the memory work that had begun in Poland at the 
local level over the previous decade. Its nominally independent status meant that it would 
be able to, in theory, work free of the influence of politicians in interpreting the 
thousands of new files that it was now in control of.  However, by 2005, right-wing 
politicians managed to influence the output of the IPN in a dramatic fashion, using its 
resources as a means to fulfill its mission of reinventing the memory of the Polish nation 
in terms beneficial to themselves.  
 It is difficult to overstate the influence of the IPN within Poland, especially with 
regards to its competition. The Institution operates under a budget close to 57 million 
Euro, which it can use to attract the top prospects away from academia and keep them in 
one place.
117
 With its own in-house publishing operation, the IPN is extremely well 
entrenched as the top academic publisher in Poland. Its output has been astronomical, and 
because it controls its own publications, its ability to control prices can vastly undercut 
the competition. According to Dariusz Stola, the “IPN is not monopolist, there are other 
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institutes that provide similar products, yet its privileged dominant position in the market 
of recent history is unquestionable; its subsidized products (books, exhibitions, etc.) flood 
the market. Would anyone buy your book if a publisher offers three other books on a 
similar topic at half the price?”
118
 
 The height of the IPN’s controversial activities in lustration was confined to the 
Kaczynski presidency, from 2005 until Lech Kaczynski’s untimely death in 2010. Prior 
to this period, the IPN had been active in executing its original directive, and had played 
a positive role in the early 2000s during the controversy following Jan Gross’s 
Neighbors, which exposed atrocities committed by a local population of Poles against 
their Jewish neighbors during World War II.  
 Direct evidence linking the Kaczynskis to overt political manipulation of the IPN 
is minimal, but several critical factors between 2005 and 2010 point to at least some PiS 
involvement in reshaping the IPN as a tool of the far right. The first event to occur that 
significantly altered the IPN’s purpose was the great prominence placed on its vigorous 
attempts to publicly denounce Poles in prominent positions who it associated with the 
Communist party. Though not a wholly uncommon practice in formerly Communist 
countries, the topic of lustration did not gain significant traction until PiS came to power. 
Likewise, one of the indicators of a politically motivated attempt at lustration was the 
IPN’s methods in seeking prosecution against those whom it perceived to be Communist 
collaborators. In May of 2008, for example, a judge threw out the IPN’s case against nine 
former members of the Communist government on the basis that the institute lacked 
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 Such a high profile instance is indicative of the fact that the IPN was willing 
in some cases to prosecute based on hearsay and speculation rather than hard fact. Cases 
like this remind one more of the political witch-hunt of McCarthyism rather than an 
actual attempt to dispense civic justice.  
 Another indicator of the IPN’s increasingly political role during the 2005-2010 
period was perhaps the most controversial action in the institute’s history. In 2009, using 
access to the IPN’s mass of internal SB files, IPN historians Slawomir Cenckiewicz and 
Piotr Gontarczyk published a scandalous book accusing Lech Walesa of collaboration 
with the secret police in the 1970s.  Reaction to the book was fierce. It had its notable 
defenders, including Anna Waltenowycz, but its list of detractors included Solidarity 
members who had broken with Walesa after his rise to the presidency, people such as 
Gazeta Wyborcza editor Adam Michnik. In an open letter in support of Walesa, his 
defenders decried the tactics used by the IPN. In it, they claimed, “The institution which 
was supposed to preserve the national memory is now taking action to besmirch this 
memory…What we are now seeing is that the ‘memory police’ are applying the same 




 The actions undertaken by the IPN to forge a new national memory created a 
similar identity perception to what occurred in Germany under the Gauck Authority. The 
major difference between the two is that the Gauck Authority’s effect was less overt, and 
it did not have a prosecutorial arm attached to it. Poles were actively encouraged by the 
government and through the IPN to recognize themselves as members of one of three 
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categories: victims, resisters, or perpetrators. Incentives were offered to resisters and 
victims, whereas collaborators and perpetrators faced social ostracism. The IPN and its 
lustration bureau were the keystones of this categorization, because it controlled access to 
the secret security archives and the dissemination of information. Furthermore, its budget 
and political backing guaranteed that it would receive greater awareness than other 
research institutions. With its ability to reach the public and its stated goal of telling 
specific stories of Polish resistance, the IPN was in the position to influence national 
memory however its leadership saw fit. Of course, its leadership during its most active 
and controversial period was appointed by a right-wing government, the same 
government that explicitly sought a new narrative of the past, one in which they, the jilted 
former Solidarity members, maintained a link to Polish independent resistance, while the 
leftist Solidarity activists made deals with the Communists, in effect creating a new 
regime with the same people and “unPolish” moral values.  
 The true strength of the IPN lies not in its subject material - “after all, it’s 
imposed by law,” says Kosc – but rather that it has become “the dominant interpreter of 
the history of communism in Poland.”
121
 With one institution holding such a lofty perch, 
it has held an entrenched position as an authority on commemorations in Poland for more 
than a decade. This might be changing, at least a little, as the PiS influence in the 
government and in the IPN has waned since its height, but as long as the IPN continues to 
hold sway as the predominant keeper of the memory of communism, it is likely to 
continue to be the main arbiter of Polish memory.  
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Two major factors leading to the relative lack of commemorations in the decade 
after 1989, namely the economy and evolving politics in the transitional democracies, are 
largely responsible for the failure of Poles to develop a truly coherent collective identity. 
The fragile state of the democracy led to a stronger focus on improving the economy first 
and foremost. The idea of commemorating the transition was little more than an 
afterthought, especially in Poland, where memories of Solidarity’s legacy were still 
uncertain. This particular state of affairs was made certain by Walesa’s war-at-the-top, 
which served to set previously allied factions within Solidarity against each other. The 
ramifications of this can still be felt today in PiS’s vitriolic campaign against former 
collaborators. This inability to have an in-depth national discussion about the transition in 
the post-1989 years echoes Svetlana Boym’s sentiments that, “Looking back ten years 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it becomes clear that, in spite of great social 
transformation and the publication of revealing documents and onslaught of personal 
memoirs, short-lived public reflection on the experience of communism and particularly, 
state repression, failed to produce any institutional change.”
122
 
This view of the past in part drove PiS’s desire to institute “The Fourth Republic,” 
an attempt to create a stronger break with the communist past and the installment of a 
government more closely aligned with the perceptions of a grander nationalist past. The 
hope was to rid Poland of the failure of Solidarity to wipe out the vestiges of the 
communist party, and through this attempt, “The campaign for the recovery of memory 
gave way to a new longing for the imaginary ahistorical past, the age of stability and 
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 The failure of Solidarity in the eyes of the political right was that, unlike in 
previous revolutions, there was no glorious defeat of the ruling power. Because of this, a 
levee en masse was not possible.
124
 Communism was not defeated through abrupt, 
turbulent revolution, sweeping in a new power, but rather withered away over a period of 
years, trying to hold back the tide of change.  
Equivalent to the failure of Solidarity to make a clean break with the communist 
regime, Poland’s focus on economy over heritage in the decade after 1989 led to a feeling 
of resentment among some Poles that opened the door for PiS’s diatribe against amoral 
Polish politicians. Looking at the physical landscape of Warsaw in the years following 
the transition and the emergence of a new capitalist system, Magdalena Zabrowska 
remarked, “In the wake of the often-ruthless and predatory encroachment of foreign 
business – what some Poles refer to as a rapacious capitalist ‘colonization’ of their 
country weakened by decades of communist economic devastation – this city seems 
overrun, if not besieged, by haphazardly placed specimens of ‘Western’ architecture.”
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Using IPN to achieve its aims by inundating the academic market with new 
material, PiS often acted clumsily and further widened the gap between left and right. 
However, by redefining the transitional period, PiS managed to start a conversation 
within Poland about the role of Solidarity’s leadership in ending communist rule. In this 
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 The parallels between commemorations in Poland and Germany show that there is 
a pattern in how former Communist countries have approached commemorations since 
1989. Conversely, the differences in how Poland and Germany commemorate point to a 
diversity of factors that go into identity and memory formation. Though this might appear 
to be a contradiction, it is quite a reasonable assertion given the premise that, regardless 
of how identity and memory are shaped, the practicalities of commemoration will remain 
constant as long as a common set of political, economic, and societal factors is present.  
 As has been seen, Poland and Germany do have a number of similarities in their 
commemorative history. In both countries, commemorative efforts were relatively 
dormant until 2005, when Right-wing governments came to power. Tracking the swing of 
national politics in both countries is an interesting endeavor in itself, because Germany 
and Poland followed similar paths in their electoral leanings. Obviously, the transition to 
democracy for Poland and East Germany were markedly different. Poland, like most of 
the other former Communist countries, transitioned from a Communist government into a 
democratically elected multi-party system. East Germany, on the other hand, was the 
only former Communist country that did not keep autonomous status. Instead, its national 
government was abandoned and East Germany was absorbed into the preexisting 
government of its Western counterpart.  
 Despite this unique difference, Poland and the newly unified Germany began their 
democratic experiences under the guidance of leaders long-experienced in fighting 
communism. In Germany, it was under the traditional and long-established chancellery of 
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Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, and in Poland it was under the presidency of Solidarity 
activist Lech Walesa and the government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 
Walesa’s immediate “war-at-the-top” in securing the presidency created divisions 
between Solidarity members that reverberate in Poland to this day.  
 Both governments failed to maintain the trust of the people to rebuild economies 
after the transition. In Germany, Kohl was abandoned in favor of the left-leaning Social 
Democrat Gerhard Schroeder, who Germans hoped would address the disparity between 
the struggling East and successful West. Poland narrowly voted for post-Communist 
Aleksander Kwasniewski over Walesa, signaling the end of Solidarity’s role as a major 
player in Polish politics. In 1993, a Social Democrat and post-Communist electoral 
victory gave that faction power for four years. There is still a Solidarity party in Poland, 
but its influence is minimal. Former Solidarity activism is still considered a political 
trump card, but members of PO and PiS, as well as other parties, can claim activism, and 
often tout their involvement as more legitimate than their opponents.
127
  
 The reason these changes in government are important to commemorations is 
because they reflected Poland and Germany’s shifting national attitudes. National politics 
was in some sense a weather vein of the cultural current. The people and ideals that led to 
the end of Communism became irrelevant in a matter of a few years as the practicalities 
of everyday life in democratic countries with struggling economies took root. Less 
concern was placed on commemorating the past because the present and future were very 
much in doubt. This is especially clear in Poland where little effort to officially 
commemorate 1989 was made. As has been discussed, there was a secondary factor 
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limiting public commemorations in the years following 1989, and that was the reluctance 
of the post-Communist government to positively remember the collapse of Communism.  
 More of an effort to commemorate was made in Germany. The Gauck Authority, 
especially the second task force in 1995, expressed desire to see a federal bureau 
established to handle remembrance of the whole Communist era. This ultimately came to 
little fruition. For the most part, commemorations were confined to the public art 
installations of the Übergang competition and the subtle but powerful influence of 
research undertaken within the Gauck Authority. It was not until several years later that 
either country would see resurgence in popular interest in commemorating the break with 
Communism.  
 Things changed in Poland in 1997 with the act on lustration and later birth of the 
Institute of National Remembrance. Initially its goal was to serve as the record keeper of 
secret police archives and as the arbiter of national remembrance of the Communist era, 
similar to the goals of the Gauck Authority, which served as its model. However, by 
2005, when the Right came to power in government in the form of the Kaczynski 
brothers and PiS, the IPN saw a dramatic shift in its goals. Fighting back against what it 
saw as the moral decline of post-Communist Poland, PiS managed to use the IPN as an 
instrument to publicly denounce perceived former security service officers and 
collaborators and keep them from holding public positions. 
 The power of IPN and its newly established lustration bureau wielded incredible 
influence, especially in the academic realm, where its ability to publish under its own 
publishing house meant it could produce research at great quantities for lower costs, 
equating to a quasi-monopoly in the field of Communist remembrance. This resulted in 
 77 
spectacular claims, the most infamous of which was a book denouncing Lech Walesa as 
Agent Bolek, a secret police informer active in the 1970s. The aims of PiS at this time 
were to cast aspersions on the post-Solidarity Left and those that it felt had betrayed 
Poland. They believed that the Round Table Negotiations had not led to a clean break 
from the Communist regime, but rather allowed communists to retain power in a bargain 
with left-leaning Solidarity members.  
Though PiS quickly lost power, its influence in using the IPN as a tool to create a 
new memory of 1989 has shaken the Polish political establishment. To some in Poland, 
Solidarity’s legacy has been permanently tarnished, and divisions between parties grow 
ever deeper. PiS and the IPN willfully segregated Polish society into victims and 
persecutors, innocents and collaborators, and used Polish nationalism and the claim of 
morality as political tools. This dichotomy has recently come to the front again as the 
Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita published an article last year indicating that traces of 
explosive chemicals may have been found on the aircraft that killed President Lech 
Kaczynski in April 2010.
128
 Though military prosecutors denied these accusations, saying 
that no such chemicals have been found, and indeed earlier inspectors at the site 
conclusively blamed human error as the cause of the crash, the Polish right-wing 
opposition has been quick to label the findings as proof of a cover-up of an assassination 
of the former president. 
The Gauck Authority never wielded quite the same amount of power as the IPN, 
nor was it ever intended to. Yet its findings were still influential, and worked their way 
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more subtly into German consciousness. The Übergang art installations of the 1990s 
were very much in tune with German attitudes towards reunification at the time. It was 
recognized as a transitional period that would require much introspection. But by 2005, 
when Hildebrandt’s Freiheitsmahnmal and Checkpoint Charlie Museum were in full 
swing, it became clear that there was a very vocal opposition to the earlier remembrance 
of the transition. The workings of the Gauck Authority had played a role in this change.  
By only focusing on the crimes of the Stasi, that is to say the most sensational 
elements of the secret police, and not everyday life in the GDR, the Gauck Authority was 
slowly separating German people into the same categories that PiS used for Poles: 
victims and perpetrators, innocents and collaborators. Further complicating matters was 
the inability to access similar West German files, which while likely less inflammatory, 
would have at least given a basis for comparison. Instead, the Gauck Authority was able 
to give the world the worst possible impression of the GDR, that its people lived in a 
persistently heightened state of paranoia and terror, always one step from danger. There 
is no question that the security apparatus of the GDR was frightening and for good 
reason, but the interpretation handed down by the Gauck Authority ignored the 
complications and normality of life in the GDR, and in the process refashioned the arc of 
German collective memory. The very concept of collective memory is a broad subject, 
indeed, but a discussion of commemorations in Germany and Poland has helped to 
establish the bridge between what societies remember and how that results in identity 
formation.  
 Commemorations of 1989 in Germany and Poland are a critical part of the answer 
to the question of what identity those people will ascribe to themselves in the post-
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Communist world. The lack of consensus that Pearce has argued is an important part of 
collective memory left a noticeable gulf in Germany and Poland in the immediate post-
1989 period. The lack of commemorations from this period are indicative of the fact that 
Germans and Poles were reluctant to remember the transition. This is in part for 
economic and political factors, as has been seen, but it also derives from the fact that 
Germans and Poles were unsure how to remember their past. Without one major, 
collective framework on which to pin their identity, they were left with a memory void.  
In Germany, Übergänge directly addressed the issue of variances in memory, 
providing a thoughtful look at all lives on either side of the Berlin Wall. However, the 
Gauck Authority would gradually change that state as its development of the perception 
of the GDR as a nation of victims and perpetrators would gradually begin to codify 
German identity. Poland had nothing comparable to Übergänge, but like the Gauck 
Authority, the IPN, under the direction of the PiS government, attempted to fill the 
memory vacuum with a framework based around a narrative of victims and perpetrators. 
Though it had some successes, IPN also faced considerable backlash for its most 
outrageous charges, and failed to achieve a consensus memory. The result is a Poland still 
divided in its perceptions of Solidarity and the transition to democracy.  
The future of commemorating the end of Communism should be interesting in 
both countries. Both Poland and Germany have seen major political changes towards the 
middle of the spectrum. In Poland, the center-right PO continues to hold power despite 
continued political divisiveness. One can only speculate as to what form the IPN will take 
next if a moderate government continues to hold sway. Germany has likewise seen a 
greater shift towards moderation. Conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel is still in 
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office, but last year she tapped none other than Joachim Gauck, a self-described “liberal 
conservative,” to serve as Germany’s president. This power dynamic is in itself important 
to modern German history, because now, after more than twenty years since the end of 
Communism, two former East Germans hold the top positions in the German 
government. Germany’s continued economic successes should serve to strengthen ties 
between its eastern and western halves, but what impact this will have on identity 
formation is uncertain. Perhaps time will have given Germans more perspective on their 
divided past, but it is also likely that any economic success could serve to reinforce the 
current standard narrative of Western victory, and the old victims and perpetrators 
stereotype.  
One does not need to look too far to find the real lessons that German and Polish 
commemorations provide. Space has always been a crucial element in commemorations, 
as can be seen in Germany, and is most useful in helping societies to visualize their 
history, especially when dealing with the concept of historical overlap; however, it is also 
a certainty that meanings attributed to any space will change over time. That is why, as 
Poland demonstrates, space alone is not the final arbiter of identity formation. The other 
major factor most typified by both countries, but is best demonstrated by Poland, is the 
degree to which political divisiveness can shape memory. The most evocative examples 
of commemoration in Poland and Germany occurred when those countries were most 
deeply politically divided. With this established, if both countries maintain a relatively 
moderate course politically, and if both can enjoy a stable economy, then one might 
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